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Introduction  
By Steven Dudley*	  
 
onduras is currently one of the most violent countries on the planet that is not 
at war. The violence is carried out by transnational criminal organizations, 
local drug trafficking groups, gangs and corrupt security forces, among other 
actors. Violence is the focal point for the international aid organizations, governments 
and multilaterals providing Honduras with assistance, and it is the central theme of 
media coverage inside and outside of the country. 
There are good reasons for this focus. Violence disproportionately impacts people in 
poor and marginal areas and tends to remain concentrated in those communities, 
closing the circle on a vicious cycle that impoverished nations find hard to break. In 
addition, violence impedes economic development and disrupts lives across a wide 
socio-economic spectrum. It can lead to major demographic shifts and crises as large 
populations move to urban areas or try to migrate to other nations. It can undermine 
governance and democracy, and it can serve as a justification for repression and 
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hardline security policies that divert resources away from much-needed social and 
economic programs, thus perpetuating the problem. 
Organized crime plays a role in this violence, but it is more like the gasoline than the 
engine: it provides an already corrupt system with the fuel it needs to run. That corrupt 
system is the focus of this study on Honduras. Its most visible manifestation is an inept 
and criminalized police force that a former security minister once called “air traffic 
control men” for drug flights coming into the country.1 Parts of this police force also 
work as custodians and assassins for criminal groups; rob drugs and resell them to the 
underworld; and, for a price, they can attack client's rivals and disrupt criminal 
investigations. 
But beneath this most obvious form of criminal connection to state officials is a more 
insidious brand of corruption. This is further from the headlines and much more 
difficult to tackle since it is embedded in the country’s political, economic and social 
systems. It operates in a gray area, mixing legal and illegal entities, paper companies 
and campaign contributions, and sweeping its illicit acts under the rug using co-opted 
members of the justice system and security forces. 
What we are talking about, of course, is the elite connection to organized crime that this 
investigation exposes. The elites in Honduras are not like those in the rest of the region. 
The traditional, agro-export and industrial elites who rule in places like Guatemala, El 
Salvador and Nicaragua are less prominent in Honduras, mostly because of the 
country’s long history as an enclave economy dominated by multinational companies: 
the original Banana Republic. Instead, the country’s most powerful economic elites have 
emerged from the service, banking, media, and telecommunications sectors. They are 
called transnational elites since many of them are first or second generation immigrants 
from the Middle East and Eastern Europe and depend on international business 
dealings to accumulate capital. Traditional, land-based elites are present in Honduras. 
But they have long been relegated to a second tier, forced to seek power through control 
of government posts, rather than using financial leverage. 
While the ruling elites in Honduras do not share the same origins or economic base as 
their counterparts elsewhere in the region, they do share their neighbors’ penchant for 
employing the state for their own ends and systematically impoverishing it. Both the 
traditional and transnational elites have for years used the military and police to protect 
their personal land holdings and businesses. They have benefitted from the sale of 
public companies and lands, and they have enjoyed tax exonerations for their multitude 
of businesses. They have also pillaged its resources, and, as the government’s 
importance to the economy has grown, relied on it to generate more capital. Their 
dependence on the state has opened the way for a third set of what we are calling 
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bureaucratic elites, who have developed a power base of their own because of the 
government positions they occupy. 
Honduras, meanwhile, has become one of the poorest, most unequal and indebted 
countries in the world. Any attempts to change this system have been met with stern 
and often unified opposition from elites of all stripes. And attempts to exert more 
regulatory control over the activities of the elites are smothered before they begin. It is 
little surprise then that the country offers criminals, large and small, one of the most 
propitious environments from which to work. On one side, an ineffective justice system 
and corrupt security forces, long exploited by these elites, opens the way for large 
criminal groups to operate with impunity. On the other side, an impoverished populace 
-- which sees and understands exactly how elites abuse a broken system -- seeks to get 
its share by working directly with criminals in the illegal and legal enterprises these 
criminals operate. Crime, as it turns out, is one of the few forms of social mobility. 
It is within this gray area that the elites themselves also interact with organized crime. 
Far from being distant from illegal activities, the elites have long operated in this realm. 
From dealing in contraband goods and services to buying permission for their illegal 
dealings and “get-out-of-jail-free cards,” those who do politics or business 
in Honduras understand that the laws governing the nation of eight million people are 
but a means to make money. Their connection to the underworld therefore is about 
societal, commercial and political interactions in the multiple spaces where business 
and politics happen in Honduras. The result is an organic relationship with organized 
crime that helps some elites reach the top and others stay there. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Honduras Elites and Organized Crime        	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  
www.InSightCrime.org   6	  
Elites in Honduras 
 
Honduran elites have a peculiar history compared to other elites in the region.2 The 
country’s economy was built on exports, like its neighbors. Unlike them, however, 
Honduras’ principal export industries -- first mining and then bananas -- were almost 
wholly foreign owned. Local economic elites were enmeshed in cattle and other agro-
industrial projects and formed the backbone of the traditional political groupings, the 
National and Liberal Parties. But a strong, local elite based on the control of land and 
agro-exports, of the type found in the other countries in the region, did not materialize. 
“The root … of Honduran exception was the country’s insertion into the world market 
and the development of its domestic political apparatus under the aegis not of a national 
agro-exporting oligarchy, but of US monopoly capital,” writes Rachel Sieder.3 
The most famous of these monopolies was United Fruit Company, which Sieder argues 
“consolidated its hegemony” over local politics in the 1930s and 1940s during a military 
dictatorship.4 Meanwhile, a smaller more traditional, landed elite shared power -- first 
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with these foreign companies and later with foreign settlers who concentrated their 
efforts on facilitating foreign-owned businesses and controlling the influx of foreign 
capital.5 These immigrant communities arrived from Europe and the Middle East 
throughout the 20th century. They have since been dubbed the “transplant” or 
“transnational” elites (or “Turcos,” a broad-sweeping and quasi-racist reference to their 
Middle Eastern origins). 
These transnational communities established control over what have become the 
dominant industries in Honduras: the financial and service sectors, telecommunications 
and media. They also acquired land, competing with and eventually overtaking the 
traditional elite’s hold on the agrarian economy as it shifted towards non-traditional 
exports. This traditional elite was largely land-based, depending on activities such as 
cattle, coffee and cacao to exert its influence. But it never coalesced the way landed elites 
did in neighboring Guatemala, leaving it largely sidelined, even as US capital slowly 
exited the country when commodity prices slipped because of increased, worldwide 
competition. Today, it can be difficult to differentiate between the traditional elites and 
the transnational elites. Although crossover is more commonly associated with the 
transnational than the traditional elites, both have diversified their economic portfolios, 
and both are deeply involved in politics. 
What is clear, however, is that Honduras’ top economic groups are run by relatively 
recent transplants that accumulated capital over the past half-century. The biggest 
business conglomerates in Honduras carry distinctly foreign names like Facussé, 
Maalouf and Rosenthal.6 Meanwhile, traditional, landed elites have shifted their focus to 
controlling government posts and elected offices. Two of the last three presidents come 
from cattle ranching families, and current President Juan Orlando Hernández is from a 
coffee family. For both the traditional and transnational elites, their business and 
political prospects are intertwined with a government that was, for most of its existence, 
less of an enforcer than an enabler. 
Throughout Honduras’ history, the state has been a source of both legal and physical 
protection for this export economy, the traditional landholding and transnational 
commercial classes. The public sector was seen, as Hugo Noé Pino notes, as a 
“concessionary state,” one that “stimulates investment but does not collect taxes.” The 
government was also a means through which the elites could expand their interests. The 
political parties represented, for many years, a manifestation of these elite interests. 
What came first for the transnational elite -- economic or political power -- is a matter of 
some debate. As Noé Pino says, there are two visions of the political-economic nexus at 
the apex of power in Honduras: 1) that the accumulation of capital was intimately 
related to the political connections throughout; 2) that the accumulation of capital was 
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what led to these close political connections. Certainly elements of both were at play. 
And as the country’s traditional exports declined, particularly in the 1970s, and 
therefore the power of the traditional elites waned, the transnational elites surged to 
take more direct control of the traditional political parties. 
Indeed, the state’s evolution during this period was intimately related to the 
development of the transnational economic elites. This class tied themselves to the 
traditional political parties, often making contributions to both parties during elections, 
ensuring their influence would remain intact whoever won. Noé Pino argues this group 
created business associations to channel their needs and influence, and that many of its 
members have been part of the revolving door between government ministries and the 
private sector that has characterized Honduras for at least the last half century. 
 
For the transnational elites, the state’s role was simple: to create and enforce rules that 
favor their continued power over key industries and the capital accumulation that 
accompanies it. Along the way, they managed public discourse as well: they bought 
newspapers, radio and television stations, and have steered popular sentiments and 
political messages towards their favored candidates and in support of their modus 
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vivendi. Since the 1970s, the media has largely become an instrument of this elite, and a 
source of its revenue.7 
The dependence of the elites on the state security forces to protect their enterprises led 
to the emergence of the military as a political and an economic player. This growth was 
aided by the United States, which, fearing the rise of communism in the region, began 
training Honduran officers en masse and supplying greater amounts of aid,8 a process 
that would accelerate in the 1980s and help transform the institution forever. Members 
of the armed forces became what we are calling a “bureaucratic elite,” something we will 
cover in more detail in the first Honduras case study. Some of their offspring are the 
political and economic elite of Honduras today and the institution is at the center of the 
changing dynamics of power in the country. 
The influx in US aid came as traditional exports continued a steep decline, and the 
country tried to diversify its economy. At the behest of its largest donor nation, the 
United States, Honduras expanded its export portfolio, lowered tariffs, sold state-owned 
businesses, and gave financial incentives for local and foreign investment, mostly in the 
form of reduced taxes. In the 1990s, as US aid dropped precipitously, multilateral banks 
filled the void and pushed for further liberalization policies. 
The efforts to diversify the economy, however, largely failed. Lacking a solid revenue 
base, and with a state that was unwilling or unable to extract tax revenue from the 
traditional and transnational elites, the government relied on outside sources to motor 
the economy. Loans from multilateral banks and others have since made Honduras a 
perennial pariah in the global banking community, further hampering economic growth. 
(In March 2014, Honduras had a $7 billion debt, up from $2.7 billion in 2007.9) And 
while the central idea was to reduce government’s role in the economy, as GDP 
sputtered, the state assumed an increasing burden to keep the economy afloat. Since 
1980, the percentage of GDP that public administration, defense and other state services 
represent have gone from 16 percent to 22 percent.10 
Despite these broad failures, both the traditional and the transnational elites have found 
ways to keep making money at the expense of the vast majority of Hondurans. For their 
part, the transnational elites took advantage of the market liberalization policies that 
began in the 1980s, and dominate the textile industry as well as tourism and 
telecommunications. They have become particularly powerful in the service sector, 
financing and constructing malls, buying into international food franchises and 
profiting from one of the country’s largest sources of revenue: remittances. Remittances 
represent some 18-20 percent of the country’s current GDP, powering the internal 
consumption that drives the service sector’s growth. 
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Source: ICEFI 2012 
 There were other new sources of licit and illicit revenue besides remittances, foremost 
among them are non-traditional agriculture projects such as African palm plantations 
and proceeds from the trafficking of drugs through the country. Drug trafficking money 
can itself be considered as a form of remittances, as the illicit capital resulting from this 
trade enters the Honduran economy, passing through the financial sector and fueling 
growth in the agro-industrial sector, construction and tourism industries. It is through 
this financial flow that the elites interact with illicit actors. As we shall discuss in more 
detail later, all forms of elites can benefit from this illicit economic activity, both directly 
and indirectly. 
Meanwhile, the traditional, landed elite has experienced a resurgence of sorts by re-
gaining control of the traditional political parties, capturing the increase in state 
expenditures and controlling more of the flow of foreign capital via their hold on public 
offices. Like the transnational elite, this group sees the state as an enabler of business 
enterprises, although in their case the opportunities frequently come via publicly funded 
projects. The corruption in this system is endemic, widespread and infused.11 They use 
these monies to maintain their grip on power, undermining or ignoring the rule of law 
when it suits them. 
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The battle for these resources is at the center of many political disputes and, in some 
ways, shapes the country’s government and political parties. The deal-making around 
these resources can get messy, as it involves billions of dollars. It is, in the end, seen by 
the elites as a zero-sum game: those who control the government levers control the 
spoils in this system; those who are separated from these levers, risk getting 
marginalized. As the dependence on these government resources increases, so does the 
need to control the government filters for these resources. 
The result of this growing dependence on state resources has been the emergence of the 
aforementioned bureaucratic elite. As illustrated in our first case study, the beginnings 
of these elites can be traced to the military rule of the 1960s and 1970s, and the de facto 
military control that continued through the 1980s. But it is in the last decade that these 
bureaucratic elites have become a force on their own and in conjunction with members 
of the traditional elites. 
This new hybrid elite’s most prominent representative is President Juan Orlando 
Hernández himself. Educated in a military school, Hernández has surrounded himself 
with military officers, including his brother who is a colonel in the army. He has placed 
military personnel in posts traditionally reserved for civilians, and has centralized 
control of the security forces and intelligence gathering under the presidency. The 
hybrid group under Hernández’s control, often referred to as the Colobrí Group, 
combines military personnel, local politicians and the landed gentry, and works closely 
with the state at the regional and national levels. Colobrí is Spanish for hummingbird. 
The resurgent traditional landed elites and bureaucratic elites have centered their 
capital growth on the control of government resources, and of key government posts 
that give access to various income streams. Those who control these posts use them to 
block other elites' access to these income streams, and to penalize rivals. Their 
dependence on these government posts and funds is what drives these elites to create 
their own political movements or develop factions within larger parties, as well as 
establish private companies that service the government's needs. 
Obtaining and maintaining these political posts is of the utmost importance, and it is 
within this context that the darkest alliances occur. The elites must gain public and 
private backing for their bids for government office. This backing comes via direct 
financial contributions, media coverage and support, as well as networking, and local 
political and economic alliances. The candidates constantly jockey for position, and their 
various suitors are ever-changing. Among them are the powerful actors of the Honduran 
underworld. 
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Organized Crime in Honduras 
Strong, organized criminal groups in Honduras date back almost 50 years. At their 
highest levels, they have centered on facilitating the movement of illegal drugs such as 
marijuana and cocaine from the southern production regions to the northern consumer 
nations. More recently they have also facilitated the entry of precursor chemicals used to 
mass-produce synthetic drugs. The money garnered from this trade dwarfs many 
traditional businesses and has the ability to upset the balance of power on a local, 
national and even a regional scale. 
There are three basic categories of criminal groups present in Honduras. First, there are 
transnational criminal organizations (TCOs), such as those from Colombia or Mexico, 
who use the country as a transport bridge and as a storage facility for cocaine that they 
are moving wholesale to the US or other markets. They tend to operate in small teams. 
Usually their emissaries seek to ensure that drug loads are secure, that officials are in 
line and that transactions go as planned. Honduras’ status as a safe haven for TCOs has 
grown in recent years, making it a good base of operations for increasingly high-level 
figures in these groups. There have been reports of members of the “board of directors” 
of the Sinaloa Cartel, for instance, having a base in San Pedro Sula.12 
Second, there are local transport groups -- or transportistas -- that operate 
in Honduras. These are mostly Honduran families or tight business networks from the 
country that move legal and illegal goods through Honduras. They work closely with 
wholesale sellers and purchasers, as well as with other transport networks in Central 
America and elsewhere. They move shipments and can also store them for long periods 
of time. Neither job is easy. There are numerous rival organizations that steal and resell 
illegal goods. These include members of the security forces, which very often include the 
police. The transport groups also have to deal with multiple officials from border to 
border. However, if done well, transportation can be a highly lucrative venture. 
Finally, there are local criminal groups and street gangs operating inHonduras. These 
groups focus on less lucrative business ventures such as local drug 
distribution, extortion, kidnapping, and human smuggling. The competition for these 
criminal markets, in particular for local drug dealing and extortion, is what 
makes Honduras one of the most violent countries on earth. Gangs routinely eliminate 
rivals and have internal purges. They also deploy corrupt security officials to attack rival 
groups. Their territorial control in some areas is absolute, although their interaction 
with elites is minimal.  
The criminal groups that have the most interaction with elites in Honduras are 
the transportistas and the TCOs. As we shall see in our case studies, these organizations 
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need authorities to help them move illicit goods through a difficult terrain. They interact 
with security forces to ensure safe passage, and interact with powerful businessmen to 
launder proceeds and legitimize their illicit capital. Throughout, they establish political 
contacts, funding candidates for public office in an effort to obtain high-level protection 
and more business opportunities. 
The money garnered from this trade dwarfs that made from many traditional businesses 
and has the ability to upset the balance of power on a local, national and even a regional 
scale. This was best illustrated in Latin America during the late 1980s, when Colombia’s 
infamous trafficking organization, the Medellín Cartel, began kidnapping elites, 
assassinating judges and policemen, and detonating bombs in public places. However, 
the roots of this dynamic can be found many years previously when Colombian, and 
later Central American and Mexican criminal organizations, began to move cocaine and 
other drugs to the US market.  
The pioneer for this transport activity in Honduras was a man named Juan Ramón 
Matta Ballesteros, the subject of one of our Honduras case studies.13In the 1970s, when 
Matta Ballesteros emerged as a prominent trafficker,Honduras already had criminal 
groups that were involved in this transport business.14 Matta Ballesteros’ distribution 
network eventually stretched from Colombia through Mexico. His allies 
in Mexico became known as the Guadalajara Cartel, which would later spawn some of 
the most important criminal groups in that country: the Sinaloa, Juárez and Tijuana 
Cartels. His allies in Colombia were members of what would become the Medellín 
Cartel. 
As we shall see, Matta Ballesteros’ Honduran network included members of the military, 
an institution on the ascent thanks in large part to US aid stemming from the Contra 
War in neighboring Nicaragua.15 It was during this era that Honduras earned the 
moniker USS Honduras. A US government document from 1988 described Matta 
Ballesteros as “a class I DEA violator.”16 His legitimate businesses in Honduras were 
also growing. By one count, he had coffee, tobacco, spice, dairy and cattle holdings, and 
founded construction and agro-industrial companies in Honduras.17 
In 1985, everything changed when the Guadalajara Cartel, seemingly angered by a US 
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) operation to seize large tracts of its marijuana 
crops in Mexico, kidnapped and killed Enrique Camarena, a DEA agent. With 
Camarena’s death, the United States government began a law-bending quest for justice. 
Over the next several years, numerous Guadalajara operatives and leaders were arrested 
and convicted in Mexico. Matta Ballesteros was arrested in Colombia, but with the 
Medellín Cartel’s help, he escaped and made his way back to Honduras, where he felt 
protected by his vast network and wealth. 
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In 1988, capitulating to US concerns about Matta Ballesteros’ increasing influence, the 
military and US Marshals intercepted him following his morning jog, bundled him up 
and transported him to the Dominican Republic where US marshals officially arrested 
and charged him with participating in the murder of Camarena, among other criminal 
acts. From there, he was taken to the US. Up to 2,000 two of Hondurans, mostly 
students angered by the move, attacked the US embassy, setting fire to several annex 
buildings and burning vehicles. At least four of the protesters were killed, and US 
officials said it took two hours for the Honduran authorities to respond their their call 
for help.18 Matta Ballesteros was later convicted in a Los Angeles court of 
kidnapping19 and drug trafficking, and remains in a US federal prison. 
Following Matta Ballesteros’ dramatic fall, the country continued to be a bridge for 
traffickers to move illicit goods.20 The list goes beyond drugs: weapons, money, people, 
and all types of contraband move in and out of Honduras. A group of Salvadoran 
smugglers, for instance, moved dairy products from Honduras to El Salvador during the 
civil war in that country. The so-called “Cartel de los Quesos” (Cheese Cartel) would 
later be dubbed the “Perrones,” and would develop a drug trafficking network that still 
stretches from Panama to Guatemala. One of their chief operators, José Natividad Luna 
Pereira, alias “Chepe Luna,” operated his network from San Pedro Sula where he had 
close contact with elites until he was assassinated in 2014.21 
In the early 2000s, Honduras experienced another surge of drug trafficking activity. At 
the time, Mexican criminal organizations that had emerged after the demise of the 
Guadalajara Cartel were establishing more control over the distribution chain, and 
began using Central America as their primary bridge. Several local transport groups 
emerged. Among them were Chepe Luna’s in El Salvador and Honduras, José Miguel 
“Chepe” Handal Pérez’s group in San Pedro Sula, the Valle Valle family in Copán, the 
Zelaya clan in Atlántida, and the Cachiros organization in Colón.22 The Cachiros are the 
subject of one of our Honduras case studies. These groups’ main function was moving 
cocaine through the region, but they also had numerous side businesses such as human 
smuggling and local drug distribution. 
The size of this criminal industry is massive when compared to Honduras’ economy. The 
US State Department estimates that 95 percent of cocaine transported from South 
America to the United States moves through the Mexican and Central American 
corridor; 80 percent of this stops in Central America.23 The price charged for moving 
this cocaine is normally the difference between the wholesale price where the drugs are 
received and where they are dropped. In the case of Honduras, this difference in price is 
somewhere in the range of $2,000 to $2,500 per kilo from the time it enters to the time 
it leaves the country.24 The price of cocaine varies, of course, but this price difference 
has remained steady for several years. This means the transport market alone is valued 
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at between $600 million and $750 million per year, or somewhere between 3 and 4 
percent of the country’s GDP.25 By our estimates, drug proceeds amount to more than 
half of those generated by the country’s top export, coffee, does.26 
All five groups mentioned above had strong political and economic connections that 
helped them develop close relationships with the authorities, as described above in the 
case of Matta Ballesteros and the military. One of them, Handal, was an aspiring 
congressman before the US Treasury Department added him to its “Kingpin List” in 
April 2013.27 He denied being involved in drug trafficking before going on the 
run.28 Handal was captured in March 2015.29 
Figure 2: Handal Organizational Chart 
Source: Taken from US Treasury 
For his part, Francisco Zelaya Fúnez had various construction companies and had 
signed a number of public works contracts with the municipality of La Ceiba before he 
was captured in Mexico in 2013. A newspaper described him as being connected to a 
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“high level official in the previous administration.”30For their part, the Valle Valle family 
had strong connections to Alexander Ardón, mayor of a town on the Guatemalan border 
named El Paraíso. Ardón’s brother, Hugo, ran the central government’s road 
construction and maintenance fund known as Fondo Vial. The core of the Valle Valle 
family was captured and extradited to the US in 2014.31 
This type of connection between criminals and political actors has become 
commonplace over the years. In 1987, congressman Félix Cerna Salgado admitted 
having a close relationship with Matta Ballesteros. In the early 2000s, three 
congressmen were captured for transporting drugs. In July 2014, Honduran authorities 
arrested Arnaldo Urbina, the mayor of Yoro, and charged him and numerous others of 
running a drug trafficking and assassination ring that was responsible for the murder of 
137 people and the disappearance of 45 others.32 
The criminal organizations’ ability to accumulate capital and wield this economic power 
to their advantage is largely hidden from view, since Honduran authorities have 
developed few strong judicial cases against them and there is not a vibrant local media. 
What’s more, public officials threaten these interests at their own peril. In December 
2009, police assassins killed Honduran drug czar Julián Arístides González, and two 
years later his outspoken one-time advisor, Alfredo Landaverde was gunned down. 
Investigating detectives quickly determined that the triggermen were police officers 
operating under orders of top police brass. But the detectives just as quickly buried 
those investigative reports, and they did not come to light until years later. In April 
2013, gunmen assassinated Orlán Chávez, the country’s top money 
laundering prosecutor.33 The day before his death, Chávez had led a raid on several of 
aforementioned Chepe Handal’s suspected properties and seized them. Suspicion fell on 
Handal, but the case remains unresolved. 
The economic might of these groups only began to come into view when the United 
States deemed Handal, and then the Cachiros, as specially designated narcotics 
traffickers, and placed them on the so-called “Kingpin List.”34Handal’s business 
holdings included various auto parts stores, a motorcycle distributor, and a clothing 
store. A US indictment, issued in the Southern District of Florida, called for him to 
forfeit $38 million in proceeds from his illicit business dealings. 
After authorities began raiding the Cachiros’ properties in September 2013, however, it 
was clear that Handal was small by comparison. The US Treasury, in its “Kingpin” 
designation, named five businesses that it said belonged to the organization,35 and 
officials from both countries estimated the group’s assets were in the hundreds of 
millions of dollars.  
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In later part of 2014, US and Honduran authorities also targeted the Valle Valle family 
organization. That family’s assets, the US Treasury said in an August 2014 “Kingpin” 
designation, included several coffee plantations and a cattle ranch. The group, the US 
Treasury declared, was moving upwards of 10 tons of cocaine through Honduras per 
month. Rough calculations by InSight Crime put the group’s annual earnings near $300 
million or about 1.6 percent of Honduras’ GDP. 
Figure 3: Valle Family Organizational Chart 
 
Source: Taken from US Treasury 
Perhaps more important than their coffee and cattle holdings was the group’s direct link 
to Ardón, the mayor of El Paraíso, and to his brother, Hugo.36 Between the two of them, 
the Ardóns managed dozens of state contracts which facilitated the movement of money 
between themselves and their legitimate and illegitimate partners. The merry-go-round 
created by this type of money flow is a critical part of understanding how corruption and 
crime work in places like Honduras. Money moves from state coffers into licit and illicit 
businesses whose owners then bankroll the candidates who are financing their projects 
or facilitating their money laundering activities. In the process, the Honduran public is 
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left out of the loop. The Ardón brothers had the perfect machine to keep this merry-go-
round spinning. 
But by late 2014, the Honduran government appeared to have them in its sights, making 
veiled references to the network in the press (calling it the “Cartel de Alex”). The 
network had created a powerful group that reached the highest echelons of power 
in Honduras. This, as our case studies illustrate, is the norm in the country rather than 
the exception, and it is changing the entire complexion of Honduras' ruling elite. 
*This report was written by Steven Dudley. Dudley, Javier Meléndez -- who acted as 
coordinator for research for this project -- along with researchers from the Centro de 
Investigación y Promoción de los Derechos Humanos (CIPRODEH) and the Asociación 
para una Sociedad más Justa (ASJ), assisted in the investigation and production of 
this report. Jorge Mejía Galindo developed the maps. Andrew J Higgens did all the 
graphics. 
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Juan Ramón Matta Ballesteros 
By Steven Dudley* 
 
n the morning of April 5, 1988, Juan Ramón Matta Ballesteros left his palatial 
Tegucigalpa estate for a jog. Matta Ballesteros was wanted for murder, drug 
trafficking and other crimes in several countries, but inHonduras he felt safe. He 
regularly hosted parties for high-level officials at his home and had connections to 
military officers.1 He employed thousands of locals at his legitimate businesses, who 
sang his praises for providing medicines, building schools and donating to charitable 
causes.2 Legend has it that he once offered to pay the government’s mounting foreign 
debt, which at least one politician appeared to take seriously.3 
Matta Ballesteros had also assisted the Honduran military and the United States in their 
battle against communism in the region. Using an airline he had set up, the United 
States shuttled supplies to the Contras, a Nicaraguan counter-revolutionary group, for 
Washington’s proxy war against the Sandinista government that had taken power after 
overthrowing Nicaragua’s corrupt, US-backed dictatorship in 1979. The US government 
paid his airline for this assistance, in spite of the fact that its own Drug Enforcement 
Administration (DEA) once categorized Matta Ballesteros as a “Class I DEA violator.”4 
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When Matta Ballesteros returned from his jog, he was surprised to find Honduran 
military and police, as well as four US Marshals, waiting for him. A US Marshal who was 
at the scene said Matta Ballesteros tried to run away but was captured. A struggle 
ensued. “During the struggle, punches and kicks were thrown by both Matta Ballesteros 
and the Honduran officers,” the marshal wrote later in an affidavit.5 “At one point, I 
observed Matta Ballesteros being wrestled to the ground, in an effort to detain him.” 
Honduran authorities finally corralled Matta Ballesteros near the vehicle the marshal 
was driving, handcuffed him, placed a black hood over his head and forced him to the 
floor of the car. Matta Ballesteros continued to struggle, pleading for mercy and kicking 
the car door as they shut it. “Don’t do this to me please,” he screamed. “Don’t turn me 
over to the gringos.”6 
Matta Ballesteros had reason to be worried. In Honduras, he might have been a 
kingmaker, but the US wanted him for the death of a DEA agent in Mexico, and there he 
faced the death penalty. “I didn’t have anything to do with it,” he screamed, presumably 
referring to the death of the agent. “Let me see my kids one last time. They are going to 
kill me.”7  
With two Honduran police in his car and a military 
escort, the marshal drove Matta Ballesteros to a 
Honduran Air Force base about an hour away. There 
US and Honduran authorities placed him on an 
airplane and flew him to the Dominican Republic. Less 
than 24 hours later, he would find himself in a US 
prison facing kidnapping, murder and various drug 
trafficking charges.8 
When the news broke of Matta Ballesteros’ extraordinary rendition, Honduras erupted. 
The military was silent on the arrest and the president spoke of “expelling” the accused 
murderer and drug trafficker,9 but on April 6, about 300 protestors marched to 
downtown Tegucigalpa; that night, students burned a US flag and a copy of the 
Honduran constitution in front of congress.10 Various congressmen and legal experts 
vilified the military and police for the “kidnapping,” and the courts that ordered the 
search and seizure of Matta Ballesteros’ properties.11 On April 8, at least 1,000 
protestors marched on the US Embassy.12 In the melee that followed, a US Embassy 
annex -- which housed the US Agency for International Development and the US 
Consulate -- was burned along with about 20 vehicles;13 shots were fired, and five people 
died. Days later, local media called the marches the “the most violent anti-US protests in 
Latin America.”14 
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The incident at the embassy was the culmination of a twisted, blood-soaked relationship 
between Matta Ballesteros, the military and the United States government. It touches 
the core of an incredibly important development inHonduras, one that involves the 
evolution of a relatively new class of elites. The group was not part of the traditional or 
transnational elites that had for so long controlled the country’s economic resources and 
held its political reins. It emerged, instead, from the armed forces, an institution 
traditionally thought of as the elite’s muscle rather than its brain. And that is where we 
need to start this story. 
Background -­ the Honduras Military’s Emergence as a 
Bureaucratic Elite 
 
The Honduran Armed Forces have always been at or near the top of the government 
pyramid, but they did not always hold power directly. For over a hundred years after its 
founding in 1825,15 the military took part in civil wars and political upheavals, 
sometimes on the margins and sometimes leading events later characterized as 
“revolutionary uprisings.” On various occasions, generals became presidents following 
their victories on the battlefield. 
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The most notable of these was General Francisco Morazán. Considered to be Central 
America’s equivalent of Simon Bolívar, the independence hero of South America, 
Morazán became president of the Central American Federation of nations before it fell 
to pieces in the late 1830s. Morazán is still present in the names of provinces, parks, 
streets and a military academy in Honduras. Politicians of the time were, in essence, 
forged on the battlefields, but the military did not necessarily hold the reins of power. It 
would be better described during this period as the protector of others’ interests rather 
than as a political and economic actor in its own right. 
Indeed, throughout its first hundred years, the military was organized in small enclaves, 
a disparate force with little centralized structure or national reach. These disparate 
forces at first protected the interests of the traditional elites -- those growing cacao and 
coffee, and running cattle ranches -- in these enclaves. Over time, their list of clients 
grew to include multinationals growing fruit and other products,16 but their role 
remained largely the same. And although the armed forces provided a means for social 
mobility, the military were not part of the economic activities it protected. 
Beginning in the 1930s, this began to change. In 1932, Honduras elected a military 
officer as its president -- General Tiburcio Carias Andino. Carias’ government -- which 
lasted 16 years -- is key to understanding how the armed forces began to establish 
themselves as an independent interest group and, eventually, as a bureaucratic elite. In 
part this is because Carias started the process of institutionalizing the military. He 
centralized the military’s structure and expanded its reach. His administration also 
created the Military Pension Regime in 1935. This would be the foundation for what was 
later called the Military Pension Institute (Instituto de Previsión Militar - IPM), which 
pre-dated even the national social security system and would 
later usurp various other important state-run companies.17 
Carias’ presidency also marked the beginning of a period in 
which military personnel were more politically active. The 
general was a National Party militant who acted in his own 
interest and that of his party.18 This included incarcerating, 
deporting and possibly murdering political opponents, 
particularly in the Honduran Communist Party and the rival 
Liberal Party. His government also censured parts of the media. Carias was, in essence, 
constructing a caste within the military, one that transcended its military identity and 
would soon be capable of regularly influencing national decision-making and asserting 
itself economically. 
By the late 1950s, the military was ready to take the next step. It started by absorbing 
the civilian police and transforming it into a national guard. Then, in 1963, just prior to 
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the general elections in which the Liberal Party presidential candidate seemed on his 
way to victory, General Oswaldo López Arellano (pictured right) led a military coup. The 
coup was the start of a period of almost uninterrupted military rule that lasted until 
1982, much of it under López Arellano. As its political alliances blossomed and it 
became increasingly aware of its own interests, the military stopped being just a 
placeholder for the elites. It focused on strengthening and securing its own modus 
vivendi. 
This shift was evident in various ways. To begin with, the military expanded its control 
over civilian sectors of the government. The armed forces effectively took control of the 
National Agrarian Institute (Instituto Nacional Agrario - INA) under the guise of a land 
reform effort. It took over the running of the customs and border patrol services, the 
airports and other vital infrastructure. Control of these posts gave the military access to 
resources, both licit and illicit, as we shall see through some military officials’ relations 
with smugglers. In addition, the military increased its stake in a number of public 
entities. From transport to telecommunications companies, arms dealerships to banks, 
the military’s economic portfolio expanded. Being in the military also came with 
economic advantages. The companies do not pay the same import or earnings taxes 
giving them a competitive advantage. 
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Throughout this period, former and active military officers continued to strengthen their 
ties to the traditional political establishment. Most of these officers worked with the 
conservative National Party, but others began to work with the more centrist Liberal 
Party. Both parties supplied cabinet members to the military governments in the 1960s 
and 1970s. Among them was Ramón Lobo Sosa, a large landowner and National Party 
strongman who was the Minister of Communications and Public Works between 1965 
and 1971, under the administration of López Arellano. (He would later serve in congress 
where he was connected -- along with parts of this family -- to organized crime.) 
The relationships between officers and politicians started a process whereby it became 
harder to distinguish between these various elites. Their interests increasingly 
overlapped at crucial junctures in politics, business and society. On the private side, 
senior officers bought funeral homes, cemeteries, car dealerships, gas stations, sawmills, 
bus services, and private security companies. Some became partners in major financial 
institutions. In 1974, for example, López Arellano founded the bank Ficensa, and later 
he became a partner in Credomatic, a financial services company that manages 
international transactions. 
Operating from within the country’s elites opened the way for other means of social 
ascension. Political power, coupled with more economic power, meant more social 
interaction amongst these elites. Soon military children were marrying children of the 
traditional elite, establishing new political-military lineages that are today marking their 
own path to power. 
In 1981, under pressure from the United States, the military announced that it would 
oversee a return to civilian control of the government. The military had, by then, firmly 
established itself as a bureaucratic elite, and it would remain an immensely important 
actor in Honduran politics and economic life throughout the next decade, in part 
because of the US interest in funding proxy wars against its enemies in the region. US 
military aid to Hondurastotaled $333 million from 1980 to 1989 (in constant 2011 
dollars), second only to El Salvador in the region.19 US general assistance 
to Honduras also soared, topping out at $289.1 million in 1985 -- most of it non-
military20; and for the decade, the United States provided close to $2.5 billion (constant 
2011 dollars) in total assistance.21 
For Honduras, this money was its lifeblood. It powered the government and the 
economy while traditional exports were waning and economic initiatives to modernize 
the economy were failing. The foreign assistance gave the military incredible power and 
leverage, which, as noted above, it used to enter the circles of other elites. 
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Perhaps the single most important symbolic illustration of the military’s reach came 
when the head of the armed forces, Gustavo Álvarez Martínez, created the 
Asociación para el Progreso de Honduras (APROH) in 1983. APROH was an arch-
conservative -- some say fascist22 -- business association.23 Among its founding 
members was Miguel Facussé, arguably the most powerful member of the country’s 
elite. Facussé was the economic adviser to the newly elected civilian president at the 
time, and served as APROH’s vice president.24 
Álvarez Martínez, however, was ousted as head of the armed forces in 1984, and left 
APROH, and the country, in disgrace amid rumors of a possible military coup. The 
APROH experience would be a lesson for some in the country’s elite, who began to 
distance themselves from the military.25 While the association continued to be a vehicle 
for the country’s power brokers to channel their political and economic interests, the 
military was largely sidelined from these alliances and backroom dealings. 
It was the beginning of the end of the military’s ascent, at least for the moment. The 
region was changing, but military officials were slow to react. The United States was 
winding down its efforts to fund proxy wars throughHonduras, a policy that had made 
the Honduran military and government seem weak and coopted by Washington. 
Marginalized and shamed, the military began a slow withdrawal from politics. It was no 
coincidence that this retreat came as the US shifted its policies from fighting 
communism towards fighting drugs in the region. By 1988, the military’s loyalties were 
split between its official patron, the United States, and its unofficial patron, Juan 
Ramón Matta Ballesteros.  
Matta Ballesteros: A Life of Crime 
Matta Ballesteros’ story is littered with confusing and contradictory claims. By his own 
account, he was born in Tegucigalpa in 1945, the second of four brothers and 
sisters.26 Some say he was a homeless pickpocket;27 others say he collected the fares on 
buses.28 Sources consulted for this report, who asked for anonymity, say Matta 
Ballesteros’ criminal career began in the early 1970s in the “Soto” neighborhood just 
outside the capital city, Tegucigalpa, where large marijuana dispensaries operated. By 
the time he was in his mid-twenties, Matta Ballesteros was known as the most powerful 
distributor in the area. 
“I remember we used to call him the ‘pusher man’ because that was when that song was 
a hit,” one source told InSight Crime. “It was a hymn for a lot of people in the 
neighborhood who were dealing marijuana and everyone knew that Matta was the best. 
He lived in a house next to the cemetery and everyone knew ‘he was in the game.’ There 
would be lines of poor people who were there asking for money and gifts, everything! 
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Everyone loved him and definitely saw him as a benefactor. But it was also clear that the 
narcs were also going in and out of his house with packages of all sizes.”29 
Eventually, Matta Ballesteros made his way to Mexico and later the United States, where 
he reportedly worked as a farmhand in Texas and a grocery clerk in New York City.30 At 
some point, he connected with groups movingcontraband and illegal drugs. By the late 
1960s, this network stretched to Washington DC, where one former DEA agent claimed 
to have arrested him in 1969, with 50 kilos of cocaine at Dulles International 
Airport.31 Another account says he was arrested at Dulles in 1970, with 24.5 kilos of 
cocaine.32In either case, he dodged the drug trafficking charges and was sentenced for 
immigration violations. 
US authorities housed Matta Ballesteros (pictured below) in Eglin Air Force base in 
Florida, but he escaped and made his way back to Mexico where he began an incredible 
rise to power and played a key role in the cocaine trade.33Although he was arrested on at 
least two more occasions in the 1970s inMexico, he managed to secure his release and 
obtain deeper relations with the growing Mexican underworld.34 During this period, he 
reportedly met Alberto Sicilia Falcón, a Cuban trafficker based in Mexico, and Miguel 
Félix Gallardo. Félix Gallardo, a Mexican from the famed Sinaloa province, was building 
what would become known as the Guadalajara Cartel.35 Matta Ballesteros also made his 
way to Colombia where he connected with those who were forming what would become 
known as the Medellín Cartel. 
Soon Matta Ballesteros became a key broker for everything from cocaine to precious 
stones to US weapons. He connected the Mexican and Colombian underworlds with 
each other providing a vital bridge across Central America for the movement of cocaine. 
He also connected them with his native country, where he became part of an emerald, 
cocaine and arms smuggling enterprise run by Mary and Mario Ferrari. And later, he 
connected the CIA to its proxy army in Nicaragua, the Contras. 
The emerald network stretched from Colombia through Mexico,36 and, for a time, 
business was good. In addition to moving illegal goods north, Matta Ballesteros and 
Mario Ferrari owned a nightclub together. The Ferraris operated 
with impunity because of their military connections. They owned 
car dealerships and a beer company located on the property of the 
director of the Central Prison, military Colonel Ramón Reyes 
Sánchez.37 
The Ferrari network was, it appears, Matta Ballesteros’ first direct 
connection with the military in Honduras. The military made sure 
their trafficking partners were not prosecuted, and smoothed their 
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passage through the airports, borders and customs houses, which the military controlled 
at the time. As described in detail in Julie Marie Bunck and Michael Ross 
Fowler’sBullets, Bribes and Intimidation, when Matta Ballesteros wanted his judicial 
records and investigations against him destroyed, for instance, he went to the 
Ferraris.38  
At some point, a dispute erupted between the Ferraris and Matta Ballesteros. Some 
sources say the fight was over a drug deal in which Matta Ballesteros felt he had been 
cheated.39 In December 1977, Matta Ballesteros’ henchmen kidnapped the Ferraris and 
flew them to Colombia where Matta Ballesteros personally oversaw their torture, one of 
the assassins later testified. They were then flown back to Honduras and killed, the same 
assassin said.40 Six months later, the Ferraris’ bodies were found in a well on a farm on 
the outskirts of Tegucigalpa.41 
Subsequent reports on the Ferrari murders by 
Tiempo and La Prensa newspapers -- and a later 
account by reporter Thelma Mejía for the 
Transnational Institute42 -- uncovered a cadre of 
military collaborators in the crime and began a 
slow process whereby military collusion in drug 
trafficking and smuggling operations through the 
country came to light.43These collaborators 
included the aforementioned Colonel Reyes 
Sánchez; Colonel Leónidas Torres Arias, the head 
of the “G2” intelligence service that is Honduras' 
equivalent of the CIA; Lt. Colonel Juan Ángel 
Barahona, Chief of Interpol; and Colonel 
Armando Calidonio, a member of the National Investigative Unit (Dirección Nacional de 
Investigación - DIN), a special investigative unit. He is also father to Armando Calidonio 
Jr., a future National Party Congressman, high level official in the Security Ministry and 
now mayor to San Pedro Sula. 
Of those implicated in the killing, Colonel Torres Arias (pictured below) deserves special 
mention. Tiempo said the murder was planned from Torres Arias’ G2 intelligence office 
in conjunction with Matta Ballesteros. But Torres Arias’ involvement in Matta 
Ballesteros’ operations appears to have gone much further than just helping to eliminate 
rivals. The colonel was also the go-between for official contacts in other countries, most 
notably with a Panamanian colonel named Manuel Noriega. The two colonels connected 
in the late 1970s, according to Jose Blandón, a former Panamanian official who worked 
for Noriega and testified before US Congress in the 1980s.44(Noriega would later 
become a military dictator, ruling Panama from 1983-1989, during which time he 
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facilitated the movement of illegal drugs to the United States, setting the stage for the 
1989 US invasion of Panama.) Torres Arias was initially backed by the CIA, which 
turned a blind eye to his involvement in drug trafficking due to his strong anti-
Communist credentials. 
Torres Arias was, in other words, the key broker who provided Matta Ballesteros with a 
way into the military bureaucratic elite inHonduras, as well as Panama. Although he was 
pushed out of service following revelations of his secret meetings to secure illegal 
weapons deals for Salvadoran rebels, Torres Arias was said to have remained close to 
the underworld for years after leaving the military,45 providing an intimate link between 
Matta Ballesteros and the Honduran military officer corps well into the late 1980s. 
Despite various public statements linking military personnel to the crime, there were no 
convictions of any of the alleged co-conspirators for the murder of the Ferraris. The 
most famous declarations came from Interpol Chief Barahona, who, after being publicly 
linked to the crime, implicated the military in drug trafficking and in the Ferrari 
murders, saying that “many stars” had been involved -- a reference to the insignias 
denoting the highest-ranking officers in the armed forces. He also said that the head of 
the armed forces at the time, General Policarpo Paz García, had buried tape recordings 
and documents that connected high-level military officials to drug 
trafficking.46 Barahona was later detained for slander, placed in solitary confinement, 
and denied access to his lawyer.47 
Mario Ferrari’s father also penned a letter to the newspaper Tiempo in which he said his 
son had worked closely with military officials and that they were responsible for his 
death.48 But in the years that followed, the government stalled, then buried the 
investigation. The implicated military officials were never charged. Matta Ballesteros 
fled, basing himself mostly in Spain for the next several years. He was eventually 
acquitted of the murder charges after turning himself in to the authorities some years 
later.49  
The government also commissioned an internal report on the matter that found no 
wrongdoing on the part of the military. The military’s press office wrote that: “No 
military officer inside the armed forces has been involved in drug trafficking, the Ferrari 
case, or in the bloody incidents that the press is reporting.” Ironically, in the same 
communiqué, the press office admitted that, “Some members of the Armed Forces could 
have been involved in irregular acts in the course of their work, directly or indirectly.”50 
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Matta Ballesteros, the Military and the CIA 
 
Drug trafficking continued and, by many accounts, increased in the years after the 
Ferrari murders. Some said that it was because of the ties traffickers forged during the 
1970s with the high ranks of the military, including Matta Ballesteros’ alleged link to 
Armed Forces General Paz García. Paz García became head of state in the so-called 
“cocaine coup” of 1978, which Matta Ballesteros allegedly helped finance.51 There are no 
official documents to back up this assertion, but Matta Ballesteros’ key interlocutor with 
the military, Torres Arias, remained on active duty through Paz García’s tenure.52  
The modus operandi for transporting illegal drugs then was similar to today. Marijuana 
and cocaine shipments moved through Honduran waters where Colombian “mother 
ships” would offload onto Honduran shrimp boats, which would then continue the 
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journey northward to the United States by sea, air, or land.53 This happened with the 
knowledge and complicity of the Honduran Navy, a DEA agent testified in 1986.54 The 
DEA agent said that when he would notify the navy of suspicious activity, it would stall 
or say it did not have fuel to chase the traffickers. Torres Arias, the head of the 
intelligence services, was involved in the drug trade, he added. “It was difficult to 
conduct an investigation and expect the Honduran authorities to assist in arrests when 
it was them we were trying to investigate,” the DEA agent said.55 
These trafficking activities also often took place with the nod from US intelligence 
officials who were now enmeshed in a full-fledged proxy war against Nicaragua’s 
Sandinista government. The war, and the fight against communism in general, took 
precedence for the United States, and as a result they allowed the movement of drugs 
north and weapons and supplies south, often under the supervision of Matta Ballesteros 
and his military allies. Blandón, for example, said that by the early 1980s Torres Arias 
and Noriega were running drugs and trafficking weapons, including many to Salvadoran 
insurgents. Blandón added that the same clandestine landing strips in Honduras used 
by planes taking weapons to the US-funded proxy army known as the Contras were also 
used to traffic narcotics.56  
At the heart of US assistance to the Contras was SETCO, an airline Matta Ballesteros set 
up in Tegucigalpa. SETCO connected Matta Ballesteros to the Honduran military and to 
the US government, which used it to move supplies to the Contras along the Honduran-
Nicaraguan border in the early 1980s. Records show that the State Department paid 
$185,924.25 to SETCO between January and August of 1986.57   
“Beginning in 1984, SETCO was the principal company used by the Contras 
in Honduras to transport supplies and personnel for the FDN [Fuerza Democrática 
Nicaraguense, a Contra faction] carrying at least a million rounds of ammunition, food, 
uniforms, and other military supplies for the Contras from 1983 through 1985,” stated 
the Kerry Report -- named for then Senator and now Secretary of State John Kerry, who 
led the Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s inquiry into US support for the Contras.58  
Matta Ballesteros was also using the company to move drugs north to his allies 
in Mexico. The report adds that other US agencies knew of SETCO’s role in trafficking 
drugs. “A 1983 Customs Investigative Report states that ‘SETCO stands for Services 
Ejecutivos Turistas Commander and is headed by Juan Ramón Mata [sic] Ballesteros, a 
class I DEA violator,’” the Kerry Report said. “According to the Drug Enforcement 
Agency [sic], ‘SETCO Aviation is a corporation formed by American businessmen who 
are dealing with Matta and are smuggling narcotics into the United States.’” 
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The contacts gave Matta Ballesteros and his military allies important cover as they 
moved cocaine and marijuana to the United States. It also strengthened his contacts 
with the Honduran military, which was surging with the assistance of the United States. 
The priority for the CIA was clear: keep the Contras afloat at any cost. To cite one 
example, the DEA agent who had worked in Honduras said he told the United States 
about Torres Arias’ involvement in drug trafficking, but, he added, the colonel remained 
a US ally during this period.59 For its part, the DEA office in Honduras was closed in 
1983 for “budgetary reasons.”60 
“Instead of moving decisively to close down the drug trafficking by stepping up the DEA 
presence in the country and using the foreign assistance the United States was 
extending to the Hondurans as a lever, the United States closed the DEA office in 
Tegucigalpa and appears to have ignored the issue,” the Kerry Commission wrote.61 
US assistance also seemed to embolden certain parts of the Honduran military. In 1984, 
the FBI seized a $40 million load of 
cocaine on a south Florida airstrip. The 
money, the FBI said, was to be used in a 
plot to assassinate then-Honduran 
President Roberto Suazo Córdova. One 
man was arrested in the United States, 
and the Honduran military attaché to 
Chile was implicated and extradited to 
the United States to face charges in the 
case. Top US intelligence officials, 
however, intervened on his behalf -- 
ostensibly because of his “service” to the 
United States in the Contra war -- and limited his punishment to five years at the Eglin 
Air Force base’s prison camp. The other suspect got 30 years in a US jail for his 
involvement in the plot.62 
“It appears that a compelling factor in United States-Honduran relations was support 
for American policy in the region, especially support for the Contra war,” the Kerry 
Commission added in its scathing assessment of the matter.  “As long as the Honduran 
government provided that support, the other issues were of secondary importance.”63 
These issues included questions swirling around the activities of Matta Ballesteros, who, 
by the mid-1980s, was one of the most important drug traffickers in the hemisphere. 
With allies in Colombia and Mexico, as well as a cadre of high-ranking Honduran 
military officers and the CIA protecting his illicit businesses, Matta Ballesteros appeared 
relatively untouchable. His connections to the Honduran military intelligence service, or 
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G2, seemed particularly powerful. According to one former member of the diplomatic 
service, the G2 requested a passport for Matta Ballesteros in 1982. “I went looking for 
the then-foreign chancellor,” the ex-diplomat explained. “He came, and he looked into 
it, and I remember that he shrugged his shoulders and said: give it to him; it’s a high-
level request, and it’s part of a negotiation that I’m not familiar with.”64 
The Murder of an Agent, the End of a Relationship 
In 1985, everything changed for Matta Ballesteros when the Guadalajara Cartel, angered 
by the DEA’s success in seizing large tracts of its marijuana crops in Mexico and cocaine 
shipments in the United States,65 kidnapped and killed Enrique Camarena, a DEA agent. 
Camarena’s murder happened slowly. A year after his death, Mexican authorities turned 
over audiotapes of an hours-long torture session of the agent and his pilot, who was also 
killed.66 In the tapes, Camarena groans in pain and pleads for his life, while giving away 
confidential information about DEA informants and fellow agents.67 “With the beating 
you have given me do you think that I am going to lie to you?” he asks his interrogators. 
Camarena and his pilot were found buried in a Guadalajara field, along with a number 
of other bodies.68 
With Camarena’s death, the United States government began to operate on the margins 
of international law in order to arrest and try several international suspects. Over the 
next several years, numerous Guadalajara operatives and leaders were arrested and 
convicted in Mexico. Others were taken illegally from Mexico to face trial in the United 
States. Matta Ballesteros himself was arrested in Colombia in 1986, but with the 
Medellín Cartel’s help,69 he escaped and made his way back to Honduras, where he felt 
protected by his vast network and wealth. 
At first, this protection came in spades. Matta Ballesteros was a public figure 
in Honduras, known as much as a businessman and philanthropist as he was a drug 
trafficker. By one count, he had coffee, tobacco, spice, dairy and cattle holdings 
in Honduras; he also founded construction and agro-industrial companies.70 He built 
schools and his businesses employed as many as 4,000 people.71 He gave cash handouts 
from his front door and was known to call the pharmacy to secure medicine for the 
sick.72 He once reportedly offered $25,000 during a telethon, which was rejected but 
garnered him sympathy all the same.73 He was, according to multiple military sources 
consulted for this study, humble and down-to-earth -- the type of person who enjoyed 
eating in the kitchen with his cooks. 
Matta Ballesteros also wielded significant political influence. He hosted parties at his 
mansion where he allegedly entertained politicians, military officials and the then-
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Honduran police chief.74 At one point, like his business partner Pablo Escobar had once 
done in Colombia, he famously offered to pay off the country’s foreign debt. Honduran 
officials seemed to think the offer might have been more than symbolic, and in 1986, 
then-Finance Minister Reginaldo Panting mused that Matta Ballesteros’ money “would 
be welcomed in our country because it would help us to improve our balance of 
payments.”75 
 
The exchange about the foreign debt represents a glimpse into the mindset of Honduran 
power holders with regards to illicit capital. Honduras was an enclave economy, 
dependent on foreign capital for growth and economic development. This intensified in 
the 1980s when, as traditional exports waned, the country leaned heavily on US 
assistance and later multilateral banks. Viewed from this perspective, Matta Ballesteros’ 
foreign-earned capital fit in well with the Honduras economic model. He was, in a way, a 
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new entrepreneur, one that could provide direct foreign investment and supply 
thousands with jobs. And, contrary to the case of Pablo Escobar in Colombia chronicled 
in one of our Colombian case studies, his largesse was publicly welcomed.  
However, the noose around Matta Ballesteros’ neck soon tightened. In part this was due 
to his involvement in the Camarena case. But it was also due to shifting domestic 
politics in the United States. In the 1980s, the US was suffering a spate of violence, some 
of which was related to increasing domestic drug consumption and drug dealing in its 
inner cities. For US politicians and government officials, foreign traffickers such as 
Escobar and Matta Ballesteros provided convenient scapegoats. With time, these fears 
would even supplant the communist threat and lead to the overthrow and jailing of one 
of Matta Ballesteros and Escobar’s many regional partners, Panamanian military ruler 
Manuel Noriega. 
By early 1988, the US government was openly discussing Matta Ballesteros (pictured 
left) and his high-level connections in the Honduran military. These included his 
longtime conduit to the armed forces, former 
intelligence chief Torres Arias, who had returned 
to Honduras in 1987, just over a year after Matta 
Ballesteros himself had arrived.76 Written 
questions submitted by US counternarcotics 
officials to a US congressional committee 
hearing referenced reports that Torres Arias, the 
former Honduran intelligence chief and ally of 
Matta Ballesteros, was an “influential advisor” to 
the then-head of the armed forces, General Humberto Regalado, and to the chief of 
military intelligence.77 
In the days following, a list of potential Matta Ballesteros collaborators, allegedly drawn 
up by the United States, was read aloud on Honduran radio. The list included the 
minister of defense, the director of Military Intelligence, the head of the navy, the armed 
forces chief of staff, and the former director of the military command school.78 There 
was also the suggestion that Matta Ballesteros counted among his backers the chief of 
police, Leonel Riera Lunati, as well as employed a cadre of ex-Honduran Special Forces 
to work for him and his security company.79 In a written response to the question about 
the relationship between Torres Arias and Regalado, the State Department downplayed 
this connection. “We do not believe he is an influential advisor,” it said, referring to 
Torres Arias. “It is normal that Torres would know Regalado and other Honduran 
military officers with whom he served.”80 
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However, the US government was clearly worried.81 The congressional hearing on the 
matter in March 1988 began with congressman Benjamin Gilman of New York outlining 
the challenges in Honduras. “A member of the Medellín cocaine cartel, Juan Matta 
Ballesteros, has set up shop in Honduras,” he said. “Already he is extending his 
corrupting influence in that society. He is attempting to buy off officials in the 
Honduran government. Ballesteros is a tough and savvy drug trafficker.”82  
The congressman later noted the Honduran military’s alleged involvement in Matta 
Ballesteros’ criminal activities. “I am also concerned about recent reports that some of 
the military officers in Honduras may very well be involved in drug trafficking, and I 
hope we’re not going to look the other way because of certain other security interests 
there,” he said, in reference to the ongoing proxy war against the Sandinista regime in 
neighboring Nicaragua. “I hope that Mr. Ballesteros has not already succeeded in 
building a drug trafficking network in Honduras, with the cooperation of some of these 
corrupt military officers.”83 
While it had downplayed Torres Arias’ ongoing connections to the upper echelons of the 
Honduran military, the State Department was also worried about what was happening 
in Honduras. During that same hearing, the State Department’s assistant secretary at 
the Bureau for Inter-American Affairs, Elliott Abrams, said cocaine trafficking 
immediately increased after Matta Ballesteros arrived in the country.84 In February 
1988, the US State Department had issued a statement outlining these concerns. 
“The department and many Honduran officials, including the senior leadership of the 
armed forces, became seriously concerned about the possibility of significantly 
increased drug trafficking when Juan Ramón Matta Ballesteros returned 
to Honduras from Colombia,” the State Department said. “We believe he is attempting 
to create a drug-trafficking network in Honduras undoubtedly with the cooperation of 
some corrupt officials. However, we don’t believe that such corruption has yet become 
pervasive.”85 
The message was clear. It was time to cut ties with Matta Ballesteros, and, on April 5, 
the Honduran Special Forces and police, along with four US marshals, intercepted him 
following his morning jog, bundled him up and transported him to the Dominican 
Republic. From there, in what can only be considered an extraordinary rendition, he 
was taken to the United States to face charges on the Enrique Camarena case, among 
others.86 Thousands of Hondurans, angered by the move and allegedly encouraged by 
the military, later protested and burned an annex of the US consulate.87 Five died, and 
US officials said it took two hours for the Honduran authorities to respond to their call 
for help.88 Matta Ballesteros was later convicted of kidnapping in a Los Angeles 
court,89 and of drug trafficking in a separate trial, and remains in a US federal prison. 
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Conclusions -­ A Mutually Beneficial Relationship 
The relationship between Matta Ballesteros and the military-bureaucratic elites was 
born out of opportunity and circumstance, but it became essential for both sides. The 
relationship began because Matta Ballesteros and his criminal allies at the time, the 
Ferraris, needed the military’s help to smuggle emeralds and illegal drugs. The military 
controlled the airports, the borders, and the customs and immigration offices, among 
other vital government posts. This control of bureaucratic positions made them an 
obstacle for trafficking illicit goods. Rather than go around this obstacle, the criminal 
network decided to coopt the military, and make them part of the team. It was a 
symbiotic relationship at the most basic operational level.  
However, the relationship went beyond this basic level to include the highest echelons of 
the armed forces and even the government. How it permeated so far is not clear. Nor is 
it clear whether this penetration went from the bottom up or the top down. What is clear 
is that it reached into the heart of the military intelligence services. Matta Ballesteros’ 
key ally Torres Arias was not a mere border guard or low-ranking soldier when he 
allegedly participated in the murder of Ferraris; he was the head of the G2 military 
intelligence service. The distinction is critical -- and the services he offered were vital. 
Torres Arias appears to have been both the protector and the conduit through which 
Matta Ballesteros developed a deep and lasting relationship with the military. While at 
first he provided protection, over time he became an offensive weapon, giving access to 
equipment, arms and personnel. Matta Ballesteros most likely used these assets to kill 
his powerful allies, the Ferraris, once they stopped being useful to him or crossed him. 
Torres Arias also helped provide conduits through other countries, such as Panama, 
where his relationship with Manuel Noriega proved equally important. 
From that point on, what emerged was nothing short of a partnership between the 
Matta Ballesteros network and the military-bureaucratic elite. Matta Ballesteros used 
his contacts in the military to create a vast and lucrative passageway for drugs moving 
north on behalf of his partners in both Colombia and Mexico. He cleverly intersected his 
interests with those of the military and the military’s other patron, the United States -- a 
point we shall return to in a moment. The use of the SETCO airline was, for instance, the 
move of a chess master who understood how to satisfy the needs of local and 
international political actors at the same time as he was satisfying his own ends. It was, 
in other words, a win-win-win. 
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Along the way, Matta Ballesteros became one of the most powerful drug traffickers in 
the world, amassing a fortune that some said reached into the billions of dollars.90 He 
used economic capital abroad to keep himself from facing any real prison time, bribing 
and threatening officials and prison authorities when necessary, in places like Colombia 
and possibly Spain. And he used his political and social capital to keep himself out of jail 
in Honduras. 
It’s tempting to imagine what would have happened to Matta Ballesteros had he taken a 
slightly different path. His economic, political and social base had positioned him well to 
transition into a more established elite. (As we shall see, it is a transition that his family 
has sought to continue, with limited success.) And he had a way of winning over the 
common people that went beyond his fame as a drug trafficker. 
“Birds always keep their nest clean,” a retired army colonel told InSight Crime. “And 
‘Moncho’ Matta wanted to live in Honduras. He wanted to help his country. He didn’t 
want to be a trafficker. If you asked me, ‘How do the people see the narcos?’ The answer 
is simple: they provide employment, they put food on the table. They help, they protect 
them. They make them feel that they are one of them. That’s why the people admire 
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them. And being pragmatic, what do the people want? To die of hunger with honor or to 
eat three times a day without honor because of what the narco is doing? The answer is 
clear.”91 
When Matta was in jail for a few days in Tegucigalpa, after he’d escaped from a 
Colombian jail and had returned to Honduras, people went to visit him. “The lines were 
enormous,” an ex military officer told InSight Crime. “They brought him food and in 
return, he gave them love [money]. Later, they went to his house in the Los Angeles 
neighborhood [of Tegucigalpa], and that is why when they extradited him the people 
took to the streets to defend him and to protest. He had established social network that 
protected him.”92 
It was this political and social capital that made him seem so dangerous to the United 
States, and accelerated his conversion from erstwhile anti-communist ally to drug 
trafficking enemy. His defiant public persona after he returned to Honduras, along with 
his involvement in the murder of a DEA agent, made him an easy scapegoat for a US 
political establishment that was searching for people to blame during a period of 
domestic turmoil. That murder, and his overt ambition to become a legitimate power 
broker, eventually caught up to him. It also impacted his family. His children could not 
get into the elite-run schools.93 The country clubs were off limits. Even his attempt to 
bankroll a telethon was rejected because of his reputation as a drug trafficker. 
This incident -- perhaps Matta Ballesteros’ first public attempt to gain legitimacy among 
the elites -- ended in humiliation. He offered a large donation to the Telethon 
Foundation, but was rejected by its main sponsor, media entrepreneur Rafael Ferrari, 
who publicly said that the money was not welcome. “I remember when Don Rafael 
Ferrari came amid the Telethon to reject this donation which I think was more than one 
million lempiras, a lot of money back then, with which the target was met and exceeded. 
But he was very brave to say no to that drug money; it was a blow to Matta,” a journalist 
who covered the event told InSight Crime.94 
The event illustrated that Matta could never be an elite in the traditional sense because 
his criminal acts, most notably the murder of a DEA agent, were simply too public and 
the figure of a drug trafficker too low on the social scale. 
Ambition was at the heart of the downfall of the Honduran military as well. Ironically, 
the military might well have achieved its vast political power without Matta Ballesteros. 
(Pictured below) It had emerged as a bureaucratic elite before Matta Ballesteros became 
its unofficial patron. The armed forces had gone from protector of the country’s wealth 
to active participant in and beneficiary of its creation. This was part of a path the 
military had forged by controlling critical government posts and state resources, as well 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Honduras Elites and Organized Crime        	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  
www.InSightCrime.org   42	  
as developing a political acumen that reached across class lines. The military’s power 
was such that it drew both traditional and eventually transnational elites into its fold, 
positioning itself to become a long-term power broker.  
However, some members of this bureaucratic elite sought more power through a share 
in the vast illegal proceeds that were there for the taking. The temptation is 
understandable. The drug money was significant, and came with undeniable power. 
Operating with underworld figures gave some military officials the resources to branch 
into new businesses and extend their political reach and influence. And, as we shall see, 
some of the families who allegedly worked with Matta Ballesteros have become part of 
new elite that is running the country today. 
Whether this was a top-down strategy is unknown and arguably irrelevant. The 
military’s relationship with Matta Ballesteros reached its highest levels. Others in the 
institution ignored that relationship, benefitted from it or participated directly in it for 
at least a decade despite its clear repercussions for the military’s internal dynamics. 
There are some, for example, that say this 
relationship may have fostered the coup in the 
late 1970s that put General Paz García in power. 
While there is little evidence to back this 
assertion, the official identified as Matta’s key 
contact in the military -- Torres Arias -- retained 
his powerful connections with high-level army 
officers for years after he’d been connected to 
Matta Ballesteros. 
There was no visible revolt against the military’s connection with Matta Ballesteros until 
it jeopardized the institution’s relationship with the United States. Following Matta 
Ballesteros’ capture in April 1988, The New York Times reported that there had been a 
“bitter factional struggle” within the Honduran military in the days leading up to his 
arrest between those who wanted to continue working with the trafficker and those who 
wanted to sever ties. The article cited the congressional hearings in which Blandón and 
others spoke about Honduran military complicity with drug trafficking as the tipping 
point.95  
In the days that followed the capture and extraordinary rendition of Matta Ballesteros, 
Honduran authorities were also in a near total state of confusion as they sorted through 
who was to blame for Matta Ballesteros’ situation and under what legal statute he’d been 
sent to face trial abroad. Although the minister of Foreign Relations claimed the arrest 
order had come from the courts, Salomón Jiménez Castro, the head of the Supreme 
Court -- the institution with the final say over the extradition of any Honduran citizen -- 
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said the court had nothing to do with the capture and deportation of Matta Ballesteros. 
Jiménez added that the US had not made an extradition request.96 Days later, Interior 
Minister Romualdo Bueso Peñalba said there was not even a functioning extradition 
treaty between the countries.97 
But far from saving Honduras via a public shaming and an illegal arrest, the US 
government shares the blame for the Honduran military’s unholy alliance with 
traffickers. The United States had been sending mixed signals to its ally because of its 
other political interests in the region. Specifically, the CIA’s active relationship with 
Matta Ballesteros’ airline SETCO, as well as with figures like Torres Arias in the early 
1980s, were an unofficial green light that illegal proceeds from the drug world were 
acceptable, as long as they served the greater purpose of fighting communism. The 
message changed only after the Honduran military’s criminal ally became involved in 
the murder of a US anti-drug agent. The killing, coupled with an increasing pressure to 
deal with drug violence at home, pushed the US government to give the Honduran 
military an ultimatum on Matta Ballesteros: Him or us? 
The Matta Ballesteros arrest was the end of an era for the Honduran military. The 
decadence and arrogance that characterized it, especially in the 1980s, had come to an 
abrupt and public end. Its principal legitimate patron, the United States, had essentially 
shamed it into shifting its priorities and reining in its unofficial patron (Matta 
Ballesteros). The public uprising that followed the arrest illustrated just how much 
political and social capital Matta Ballesteros had built in Honduras. It also illustrated 
the frustration of the population that the country had been used as a US military base 
for nearly a decade. 
Following the extraordinary rendition of Matta Ballesteros, the Honduran military 
began a backslide into political purgatory. While the arrest of Matta Ballesteros did not 
cause this shift, it contributed to it. The civilian government soon replaced military 
supervisors that had run various state institutions for years. This included national 
phone company Hondutel, the Agrarian Institute and immigration services. The 
business association APROH distanced itself from the military core that had created it. 
And the government formally reestablished a civilian police force, separate from the 
military. 
Still, various ex-military officials used this period to launch business and political 
careers, setting the stage for the next generation of bureaucratic elites. To be sure, the 
bureaucratic elite that emerged in the half century prior to Matta Ballesteros’ arrest did 
not disappear after it, but simply shifted gears, rebranded itself as the country’s top 
crime fighting body, and embraced its long-time alliance with the National Party. The 
results are evident in today’s ruling class.  
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Epilogue: The New Bureaucratic Elite and Organized Crime 
On July 31, 2014, Honduran authorities seized 17 properties belonging to Juan Ramón 
Matta Waldurraga, the son of Juan Ramón Matta Ballesteros.98 There had long been 
rumors about Matta Waldurraga’s involvement in the drug trade, and the family has had 
various run-ins with the law since Matta Ballesteros was jailed. In 1993, Colombian 
police arrested Jaime García García, Matta Ballesteros’ brother-in-law, and charged him 
with trafficking cocaine to the United States via Costa Rica.99 
In 2004, an airplane carrying illegal drugs landed in front of one of Matta Waldurraga’s 
properties in the state of Olancho, having allegedly come from Colombia.100 In the 
following years, Colombian authorities also confiscated properties and detected large 
sums of money from the family moving in and out of that country.101 And in 2005, the 
director of immigration for Honduras was arrested for allowing 14 Colombians linked to 
Matta Waldurraga (pictured right) to enter the country without visas.102 
In interviews for this report, current and 
former officials routinely referred to Matta 
Waldurraga as his father’s successor in the 
drug trade, as well as a person who manages 
government contracts and serves as a kind of 
informal bank for the underworld. But the 
recent seizures were not accompanied by a 
public order for his arrest, and Matta 
Waldurraga has never been charged with a 
crime in Honduras. In declarations to the press, Matta Waldurraga called the 2014 
seizure operation a “payasada,” a joke, and said the property was inherited from his 
grandmother.103 The family also protested the government’s confiscation of its property, 
but there was little it could do. The properties, the Honduran government said, were 
purchased with illegal proceeds and were thus subject to confiscation under a new law 
the government had passed just two years earlier.104 
The government’s aggressive actions against the family would have been a surprise if it 
had not already made clear its intention of taking a hard line on crime. Since entering 
office in 2014, the administration of Juan Orlando Hernández, a National Party stalwart 
with a military education and bloodline, had illustrated its resolve against the drug 
trade. In addition to its actions against the Matta Ballesteros clan, the Hernández 
administration had captured and extradited a Honduran accused of drug trafficking to 
the United States -- the first national extradited in over 100 years;105 and captured three 
top members of the Valle Valle clan,106 a powerful drug trafficking family based in the 
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western department Copán, who one US official told InSight Crime had been moving up 
to 20 tons of cocaine per month through the country.107 The Honduran government had 
also effectively declared the country a no-fly zone for traffickers when it passed a law 
authorizing the air force to shoot down suspected drug flights in its air space.108 By late 
2014, nearly half of the Honduran drug traffickers wanted in the US were in 
custody,109 and drug flights were down considerably, according to interviews with 
Honduran and international drug agents.110 
Hernández established his administration as firmly opposed to organized crime, and he 
did it with a coalition that was eerily reminiscent of the military-dominated government 
of the 1980s. While he has not served in the military himself, Hernández -- who is a 
long-time National Party strongman and a former president of Congress -- has 
surrounded himself with numerous current and former military personnel. This 
includes his brother, Amílcar Hernández, who is one of his most important security 
advisors; retired General Julián Pacheco, who has held several important posts 
including that of security minister; and Oscar Álvarez, a former Honduran Special 
Forces officer who trained and studied in the United States and has held ministerial and 
congressional posts.  
For his part, Pacheco is arguably the most powerful member of the bureaucratic elite 
since Paz García left office in 1981. After winning the presidency, Hernández 
immediately tapped the former head of military intelligence to direct FUSINA, an inter-
agency task force created to fight organized crime. Among other powers, FUSINA has 
control over the National Anti-Extortion Force (Fuerza Nacional Antiextorsión - FNA). 
The FNA controls the government’s only phone-interception unit and reportedly 
maintains tight control of intelligence operations. Pacheco’s powers increased in early 
2015, when he became the country’s first active military general to be appointed security 
minister. He had to officially retire from service to take the post, and, in an interview 
with InSight Crime, he claimed that rumors about his reach were greatly 
exaggerated.111 “I don’t have as much power as people credit me with because it’s not 
true,” he said. “Plus the only power I can have is the experience I've managed to 
accumulate over a 35-year career.” 
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Another close advisor to the president is Álvarez. Álvarez is a descendant of the military-
bureaucratic elite: his uncle was General Gustavo Álvarez Martínez, the founder of the 
military-founded business association APROH. He trained with US Special Forces 
before serving in the Honduran Special Forces. As a powerful member of the National 
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Party, Álvarez has been a close advisor to more than one president. He was security 
minister in 2002 and then again in 2010, under Porfirio Lobo, who he also helped get 
elected. He later did the same for Hernández, working on his campaign and helping 
design his security strategy. Álvarez was elected to congress in 2013, and is the head of 
the National Party’s caucus in the legislative body. 
One of Álvarez’s close party confidants over the years is also from an important military 
family. Armando Calidonio Alvarado served as Álvarez’s second at the Security Ministry 
from 2002-2005 and then again from 2010-2011. He also worked on the campaigns of 
Lobo and Hernández, and became a congressman. In 2013, he was elected mayor of San 
Pedro Sula. Calidonio’s father, also named Armando Calidonio, was one of those 
accused of links to the Matta Ballesteros network following the assassination of the 
Ferraris. 
Echoing the 1970s military governments, Hernández has stacked the government with 
military personnel in what are traditionally civilian-held positions. In addition to 
Pacheco, he has placed military personnel as the heads of Civilian Aeronautics, the 
prison system, the national ports, the special “development zones,” the agricultural 
development institute and the housing authority.   
The Hernández government is, in essence, a hybrid of bureaucratic and traditional land-
owning elites. The president’s own background illustrates this fusion. One of 17 
children, Hernández studied at a military school, but his family was small coffee 
farmers. He seems to have ascended via his political connections and his marriage to 
Ana García Carias, a direct descendent of the military dictator Tiburcio Carías Andino, 
the same Carías Andino who had set in motion numerous changes in the military that 
led to its eventual emergence as a bureaucratic elite. These connections have helped 
Hernández secure lucrative business deals. He reportedly owns coffee farms, amongst 
other agricultural holdings, as well as hotels, and radio and television 
stations.112 Hernández is also a National Party strongman. He has gained support for 
and received support from party heavyweights such as Porfirio Lobo and his brother, 
Ramón, and he reportedly tightly stage-manages the party. He has been linked to a 
mysterious lobbying group called Colibrí, which has reportedly engineered lucrative 
government contracts and kickback schemes for its members and supporters.113 
However, the Hernández administration’s power is most evident in the security forces. 
In addition to centralizing the control and flow of intelligence through the hands of 
Security Minister Pacheco, as president of congress he engineered a law that created a 
5,000-member military police.114 As president of the country, he has strengthened that 
force. Both Hernández and Pacheco insist that the military police is only a temporary 
measure, but in 2015 Hernández moved to enshrine the force in the country’s 
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constitution. The measure failed. However, Hernández (pictured below) said he would 
try again at a later date.115 
The reach and power of the military-bureaucratic elite frightens some observers, 
especially since the institution’s relationship with organized crime is still in question. 
Álvarez’s first tenure as security minister, for instance, coincided with a crackdown on 
gangs in Honduras carried out, in part, by a police-run death squad known as the 
Magnificos.116 One alleged member of this group was a police commander named Juan 
Carlos “El Tigre” Bonilla. The police inspector at that time said she had initiated 13 
internal investigations into Bonilla’s activities, including the murder of several men who 
had kidnapped and killed a former minister, Reginald Panting, the same man who had 
publicly entertained Matta Ballesteros’ offer to help pay down the country’s debt.117 The 
cases were archived, the inspector said, because of Álvarez. 
Though President Hernández has not himself been implicated in criminal activities, his 
presidential campaign had some questionable 
operatives, including Hugo Ardón, who headed 
up Hernández’s presidential campaign in the 
western part of the country. Ardón ran the 
highway authority for years up until June 2015, 
during which time he approved numerous 
government contracts to companies run by 
criminal groups such as the Cachiros, a once 
powerful clan based in the Colón province and 
the subject of our other Honduras case study. 
Ardón’s brother, Alexander, was the mayor of El 
Paraíso, Copán, an important drug trafficking 
corridor. As mayor, Alexander became infamous for having reconstructed city hall in the 
image of the White House, complete with a heliport. Authorities told InSight Crime in 
2015, they were investigating Alexander for drug trafficking.118 
The National Party has had its share of high level figures connected to criminal 
activities. Ramón Lobo, a former congressman and brother of former President Porfirio 
“Pepe” Lobo has been under scrutiny for years. Ramón’s daughter, Margarita, was 
injured in a 2003 attack by the Cachiroscriminal organization on a rival trafficker who 
was allegedly dating Margarita at the time. In 2012, Ramón himself attended the 
inauguration of a gasoline station and mall in the state of Colon; the mall was 
constructed by Javier Rivera Maradiaga, the leader of the Cachiros.119 
Pepe Lobo has also been connected to criminal elements. During his term in office, the 
son of José Natividad “Chepe” Luna Pereira, posted a photo of the then-president on 
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Facebook with his father. Luna, a Salvadoran national wanted at the time by the United 
States for drug trafficking, owned and ran a fleet of buses and trucks from his 
headquarters in San Pedro Sula. When he was arrested in Honduras in 2011, during 
Lobo’s time in power, Salvadoran and US authorities scrambled to get him deported 
to El Salvador where he was facing drug trafficking charges, but a judge mysteriously 
released him before they could mobilize their resources. Lobo did not return InSight 
Crime’s efforts to seek comment.120 Luna was assassinated in San Pedro Sula in 2014.121 
The Lobo family has continued to face scrutiny since Lobo left office. In May 2015, 
Lobo’s son, Fabio Lobo Lobo, was  captured, reportedly in Haiti, and taken to New York 
to face drug trafficking charges.122 Lobo did not defend his son and told the press that he 
would have to face the consequences of his actions. In a tweet, the US Ambassador 
to Honduras, James Nealon, declared: “No one is above the law.” 
*This report was written by Steven Dudley. Dudley, along with researchers from the 
Centro de Investigación y Promoción de los Derechos Humanos (CIPRODEH) and the 
Asociación para una Sociedad más Justa (ASJ), as well as an independent researcher 
who wishes to remain anonymous, assisted in the investigation and production of this 
report. Jorge Mejía Galindo developed the maps. Andrew J Higgens did all the 
graphics. 
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The Cachiros 
By Steven Dudley* 
 
s it tends to happen in Honduras, the news began as a well-heeled rumor: Javier 
Rivera Maradiaga, the oldest of the three Rivera Maradiaga brothers still alive 
and leader of the feared and powerful Honduran drug trafficking group known as 
the Cachiros, had handed himself in to United States authorities to face drug trafficking 
charges. 
A few days later the news leaked on to social media, then it was on the radio,1 and then 
in several newspapers.2 Soon, it was clear that Javier was in US custody. What’s more, 
Javier’s brother Devis Leonel and possibly his other brother, Santos Isidro, had also 
surrendered to face the charges. 
The details of their surrender were sketchy. One of the more popular versions said they 
had handed themselves in to the US Embassy in Tegucigalpa.3 But others said it 
happened on an island in the Caribbean, most likely the Bahamas.4 Still others told 
InSight Crime that it occurred at sea, in international waters.5 In all three scenarios, the 
results were the same: the core of a group that few in Honduras even talked about just a 
few years ago was in US custody. 
The timing was not a coincidence. The Cachiros had been virtual fugitives in their own 
country for years. Even though they did not face criminal charges in Honduras, the US 
government had made them the poster boys for international drug trafficking in the 
country when the US Treasury announced in 2013 that it was targeting the group’s 
assets. This was for good reason. The organization, which began as a family of cattle 
rustlers, had risen to create a multi-million dollar empire that included legal and illegal 
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businesses across Honduras' northern seaboard. They were financing political 
campaigns and even had a stake in a popular soccer team. 
More importantly, the Cachiros’ businesses had intersected with important Honduran 
elites. These elites included some of the most well-established names in Honduras’ 
business and political circles. The records show that the business partnerships were 
clear, but the business and political relationships these elites had with Rivera 
Maradiagas were hazy. Did the elites know who they were dealing with? Was the source 
of the Cachiros’ wealth known? Did it matter since the Cachiros were not facing criminal 
charges in Honduras? These are questions that few people ask in places like Honduras. 
Money can smooth over most transgressions, especially with impunity rates that reach 
into the 90th percentile. 
But there is always the off chance that word could leak out beyond the inner circles of 
power to those in United States law enforcement who are somewhat less forgiving. This 
seemed to be the danger with the Cachiroswho, more than seeking to account for their 
past, seemed to be fleeing to the only safe place left for them. In the days following their 
surrender, Óscar Álvarez, a powerful congressman and two-time former security 
minister, said those who had “worked with [the Cachiros], done business with them, 
should be worried."6 Later, press reports said the brothers were cooperating with US law 
enforcement in exchange for the safety of their immediate family and other relatives.7 
Just what the Cachiros feared had become clear in the days prior to the reports of their 
dramatic handover. Their network included a wide ring of third party owners and 
political brokers who held an equal or greater amount of damning information about 
their contacts with Honduras’ elites of the type Álvarez cited. Among those brokers was 
a man named Juan Gómez Meléndez. Gómez was a former governor and congressman 
who at some point began managing Cachiros’ businesses.8 Like the Cachiros, there were 
rumors about Gómez handing himself in to US authorities, but Gómez did not make it as 
far as the Rivera Maradiaga brothers. He was murdered as he exited a bank in the city of 
Tocoa,9 the Cachiros’ de facto headquarters for close to a decade before their flight the 
US penal system. 
According to at least one press account, Gómez’s murder solidified the Cachiros’ 
decision to flee into US arms.10 For years, they had provided a huge injection of 
resources into the banking system, the agricultural and tourist industries, and various 
political parties’ coffers. In return, they had enjoyed a run as one of the most powerful 
drug trafficking organizations on the isthmus. But, as Gómez’s murder clearly showed, 
that run had ended, and they were in danger of being assassinated themselves. In other 
words, theCachiros understood that their utility to the Honduran elites had run its 
course. It was time to leave while they still could.   
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Background – Northeastern Honduras and Development in 
Isolation 
The northeastern coastal area where the Cachiros operated covers the states of Colón, 
parts of Gracias a Dios and Olancho, and stretches as far west as the city of San Pedro 
Sula. The region has been in the strange position of being the site of huge agro-
development projects, but little infrastructure. The Truxillo Railroad Company, a 
subsidiary of the United Fruit Company, operated from Colón state in the early 
20th century. Large areas of land were distributed to peasant groups during an 
aggressive agrarian reform project in the 1970s and 1980s, but agribusinesses like the 
Standard Fruit Company, a subsidiary of Dole Food Company remain operational in the 
zone. 
In the 1990s, with a law that allowed this land to be sold to private owners, some of the 
land passed into the hands of large agro-interests, most notably Miguel Facussé, one of 
Honduras’ wealthiest men. The process remains in dispute to this day and is discussed 
in more detail below. Suffice to say that Facussé and numerous others have since 
developed large African palm plantations that stretch the length and width of what is 
known as the Bajo Aguan Valley, a fertile region with numerous rivers that makes the 
area an attractive zone for farming. Other large industries -- most notably cattle and 
mining -- are also present and growing in size and importance in the area. 
Despite the presence of these large economic interests, the area remains to this day 
relatively isolated from the central governing structures of Hondurasin Tegucigalpa. 
Only one major road leads to the country’s industrial capital, San Pedro Sula. In fact, the 
first paved road to any city in the region -- from La Ceiba to Trujillo -- was not finished 
until the 1980s. 
The only major development of this area can be attributed mostly to its tremendous 
access to the sea, which has helped it attract some tourism as well. That reality helps 
explain why Trujillo was Honduras’ first capital and major port, and the first place 
where Spanish ships docked on the Central American mainland. Efforts to fend off near-
constant incursions by pirates led many to flee inland, accounting for the larger 
settlements, such as Tocoa, which today are the centers of economic and political 
activity in the zone, even though Trujillo remains the political capital of the department 
of Colón.  
Given the relative isolation of the area, it is to be expected that its economic activity 
centered more on trade along the coast and with other Caribbean nations than with the 
central part of the country. In the 19th century, elite families such as the Castillos and the 
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Julias, who formed the “Julia & Castillo” corporation, exported cattle to Cuba.11 Another 
family, the Crespos, imported liquor from Cuba.12 The Crespo family later intermarried 
with another elite family, the Melhados, to form the nucleus of a political-economic elite 
that would dominate the area’s political and economic activities through the end of the 
20th Century. 
Whether for political or economic reasons, these elites worked hard to keep the area for 
themselves. To cite but one example, José Castillo Melhado, a congressman from Colón 
in the 1930s, helped the Truxillo Railroad Company get out of a contractual obligation to 
the government that would have led to the building of a railroad between Trujillo and 
Tegucigalpa. In the meantime, the elites continued to develop the coast and inland areas 
to receive and process imports from as far away as England.13 This relative isolation may 
also have facilitated the illicit activities of these elites. At least one researcher suggests 
the elites benefitted from contraband trade, much of it from England.14 But while it 
seems a very probable scenario, InSight Crime could not find any documentation to 
substantiate these claims. 
As in the rest of Honduras, many of the elites in the northeast were of foreign origin. 
The Glynn family, descendants of English immigrants, operated the lucrative Truxillo 
Railroad Company. The Glynns eventually became one of the foremost import-export 
families in the area, as well as large land and cattle owners.15 These families came to 
dominate the political arena in the northeast and occupied many diplomatic posts, 
especially those in England, the United States and Spain. 
In the 1970s and 1980s, the northeast became a center of experimentation and 
alternative development, a process that facilitated the arrival of other elites to the area. 
Under the rule of a two-time military dictator, General Oswaldo López Arellano, the 
country embarked on an agrarian reform that called for the expropriation of upwards of 
600,000 hectares, a good portion of which would come from the Standard Fruit 
Company.16 That ambitious proposal was truncated for political reasons, but some of the 
company’s land did pass into the hands of farming cooperatives, which, with the help of 
the government, formed the Empresa Asociativa Campesina de Isletas (EACI).  
For a few years, the EACI was the envy of cooperatives throughout Central America. It 
exported bananas, and its operators became important political and social leaders in the 
region. The EACI, however, was short-lived. It suffered from corruption, and the 
military government systematically persecuted its leaders during the 1980s. Its sales fell 
off, and in a highly controversial deal in the early 1990s, as much as 8,000 hectares of 
its lands were sold to various suitors including Standard Fruit and entrepreneurs like 
Miguel Facussé.17 The land deal with Facussé has been at the center of a contentious and 
near-constant battle between the remnants of the cooperatives that formed the core of 
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the EACI, on one side, and Facussé, among others, on the other. As we will see with 
the Cachiros, criminal actors have taken advantage of this tumult to advance their own 
interests. 
The land sale was the beginning of a wholesale change of elites in the northeast. The 
power of the traditional import-export and land-based elites of the area waned to some 
extent, while the transnational elites, particularly Facussé, entered the area in force. 
What remains is a combination of the various elites described in the introduction to 
the Honduras section. Traditional elites are major players in the region. Ramón Lobo, a 
former congressman and brother to ex-president Porfirio Lobo, is chief among them. 
Others, including congressman Oscar Nájera are large landowners in the Bajo Aguan as 
well. 
The combination of agrarian reform, government incentive programs and the 
emergence of the African palm industry has bolstered the region’s population. Census 
data shows that the population of Tocoa grew four-fold in the last quarter of the 
20th century.18 It’s not clear that the economy has sustained enough growth to support 
this burgeoning population. African palm, for instance, is labor intensive at the outset 
but not over the long term. 
This is the gap that the new criminal economy fills in the region. It is difficult to say how 
much organized crime has played a role in the development of the zone. Numerous 
regional experts told InSight Crime researchers19 that, at the very least, increased 
economic activity gives criminals an opportunity to launder their earnings. But others 
declared that criminal proceeds are a major motor of economic activity and certainly a 
generator of employment. Although the extent and length of the criminals’ reach is 
impossible to measure -- as is clear from the case of the Cachiros -- it is significant. And 
this influence has stretched into the political, economic and social spheres of life in the 
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The Cachiros 
Figure 1: Cachiros’ Organizational Chart 
 
Source: Taken from US Treasury 
One of the most important criminal groups in Honduras in the last two decades was 
the Cachiros. At the core of the Cachiros was the Rivera Maradiaga family, who come 
from Cayo Sierra, a small town outside Tocoa. By numerous accounts, the family’s 
underworld activities began with cattle rustling.20 A Honduran intelligence official said 
the family was also involved in car theft.21 The family’s activities in the underworld 
increased when it came into contact and began working directly with Jorge Aníbal 
Echeverría Ramos, alias "El Coque." Less is known about El Coque, but he appears to 
have been a leader of another trafficking, theft and contraband organization whose 
fortunes -- along with the Cachiros’ -- were rising in the early 2000s. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Honduras Elites and Organized Crime        	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  
www.InSightCrime.org   65	  
At the time, Honduras was becoming a more important corridor for cocaine moving 
north. The reasons are many but center mainly on the Mexican criminal groups’ seizing 
control of the distribution chain from their Colombian counterparts. The natural 
cocaine transport corridor for these Mexican groups is Central America. Upticks in 
Central American drug seizures during this period speak to this trend.22 The increased 
volume of drugs meant increased returns for organizations like those of El Coque and 
the Cachiros. 
El Coque had powerful allies that helped him grow into a formidable force. News reports 
linked him with Margarita Lobo, the daughter of aforementioned political heavyweight 
Ramón Lobo.23 Lobo was a congressman at the time. His brother, Porfirio, was the 
president of the Congress and would become president of Honduras a few years later. 
Ramón Lobo has ever been charged with trafficking illegal drugs or anything related to 
organized crime activities. 
El Coque also made powerful enemies, including the Cachiros. It’s not clear why the rift 
occurred. One report said El Coque killed one member of the Rivera Maradiaga 
family,24 but there is no definitive account. What is clear is that at some point there was 
a violent split, and the Cachiros went on the offensive. Assassins first tried to kill El 
Coque in San Pedro Sula, putting 25 bullet holes in one of his vehicles and injuring 
Margarita Lobo in the process.25 El Coque survived and fled to Cuba, then to Costa 
Rica where another team of assassins tried a second time. After that failed as well, El 
Coque went to Panama, where he was arrested and returned to Honduras. On his fourth 
day in jail, assassins shot El Coque three times, killing him.26 
Led by the eldest brother Javier, the Cachiros took control of some of the most 
important cocaine routes on the isthmus. Colón is strategically located along the 
northeastern coastline: to the east is Gracias a Dios state, and to the south Olancho. 
These three states have become some of the best landing areas for small aircraft carrying 
drugs from South America, in part because of the infrastructure left by the agro-export 
economy that once thrived in the area. There is little state presence, and vast stretches of 
land that are used to create makeshift, clandestine airstrips. There are also large tracts 
of African palm plantations and other agro-industrial businesses that can help 
camouflage the storage and movement of illicit products. In addition, the coastline 
receives drugs by sea, ferried via go-fast boats and fishing vessels. 
There is reason to believe that large landowners facilitate at least some movement of 
illicit goods through the area. A March 19, 2004, US diplomatic cable released by 
WikiLeaks says an unauthorized aircraft carrying about a ton of cocaine landed on 
Miguel Facussé’s ranch a few days earlier.27 The cable says Facussé himself told the 
police the airplane had landed on March 16, and that guards on his property had fired 
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on the aircraft, which had burst into flames. However, the diplomatic cable cast doubt 
on Facussé’s version of events. The cable, citing police and other “sources,” says the 
plane landed March 14; about 30 armed men offloaded the cocaine, then burned the 
aircraft. 
 
“Facussé’s property is heavily guarded and the prospect that individuals were able to 
access the property and, without authorization, use the airstrip is questionable,” the 
cable says. “In addition, Facussé’s report obviously contradicts other information 
received from the law enforcement source about the actual date of the event and TAT’s 
[Tactical Analysis Team] intelligence about the March 14 air track.”  
There is no evidence to suggest that this cocaine was part of the Cachiros’ illicit business 
dealings in the area. In fact, as detailed below, the Cachirosmay have worked against 
Facussé’s interests, fomenting armed incursions onto his lands. 
The Cachiros themselves also have sufficient land to move, store and dispatch illegal 
goods. As noted in more detail below, they own vast amounts of African palm and cattle, 
and have other infrastructure and companies to facilitate these activities without having 
to rely on others. The event on Facussé’s land is more noteworthy as a means of 
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illustrating the opportunity -- or risk, depending on your interpretation of the event -- 
for the largest of landowners in the area. 
The area also offers a large pool of labor. Under- and unemployed fishermen and boat 
operators are available to receive and store illicit goods. They can also help refuel boats 
and work as lookouts. A large, isolated and marginalized indigenous population that 
stretches into Nicaragua offers further services for illicit activities. An alleged Cachiro 
associate, Bismarck Antonio Lira Jirón, was arrested in Nicaragua, where authorities 
charged him with money laundering, among other crimes, after discovering his 
multimillion-dollar offers to buy land in various parts of the country.28 
By numerous accounts, the Cachiros were a tight-knit organization. They kept most of 
their dealings within the family and close friends. While Javier was the leader, his 
brothers, Dévis Leonel and Santos Isidro, reportedly developed other military and 
business ends of the group. His father, mother, sister and at least one cousin were 
involved in the business side. Still, in order to run their main business of trafficking 
cocaine, the organization had to contract out much of its operations to other, small 
groups. These included a pool of seafaring and land-based transporters, mechanics, 
lawyers and other infrastructure necessary to keep the operation running smoothly. 
Throughout its existence, the organization had to develop contacts within the security 
forces. The most important was the police. The Honduran police are known as one of the 
most corrupt in the hemisphere. Police have been linked to drug trafficking, car theft 
rings, extortion schemes, and death squads. Attempts to purge the police have largely 
failed and led to the resignation of at least one security minister.29 The police are, in 
essence, at the service of the highest bidder. 
In Colón, the Cachiros allegedly kept the police chief on their payroll, and officers often 
had to pay a price to get that post.30 These police formed the first ring of protection. 
They ensured the group and its associates were aware of any law enforcement presence 
or activity. The Cachiros’ reach went to the highest level of the institution. The list of 
suspected collaborators compiled by InSight Crime investigators includes a former 
Honduran national police chief. None of these police have been investigated or 
prosecuted by authorities making it difficult to declare with any degree of certainty 
exactly what this relationship entailed. 
The Cachiros also worked to infiltrate other parts of the security forces. The military 
officer in charge of Colón told InSight Crime that his driver worked with the criminal 
group until he transferred him. He said he had lost trust in the other soldiers as well. In 
apparent confirmation of that suspicion, the officer whispered answers to questions 
when his troops stood nearby. The criminal group had also tried to insert its people into 
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top-level security ministry posts. One emissary, Colón congressman Juan Ramón 
Salgado Cuevas, was assassinated in 2006 after he failed to push the Cachiros’ candidate 
into the ministry, intelligence sources told InSight Crime.31  
The Cachiros maintained contacts at the highest levels of the judicial and security forces, 
InSight Crime researchers found. Prior to their flight to the US, members of the Rivera 
Maradiaga family had been arrested on at least two occasions, but were not prosecuted. 
According to various Honduran officials interviewed by InSight Crime researchers, 
Dévis Leonel still faces charges for attempted murder stemming from the 2003 attack 
that injured Margarita Lobo; and Santos Isidro has an outstanding warrant related to 
illegal weapons possession. But even after the US Treasury designated them as 
“kingpins” in 2013, and the Honduran authorities began to target and seize numerous 
assets, the family members did not face formal criminal charges for drug trafficking 
in Honduras. What’s more, by the time authorities reached their bank accounts to seize 
their money, the accounts had been emptied.32 
The Cachiros’ business model worked. They accumulated considerable wealth from their 
illicit project. Authorities give wide-ranging estimates for how much cocaine moves 
through the Cachiros’ area of influence, but they agree that it is significant, or at least 
was significant at the group’s height. At the low end, authorities said the group was 
moving between one and two tons per month; at the high end, they put it at between 
four and five tons a month. The range of monthly earnings was therefore between $2 
million and $12.5 million.33 Authorities say the group also controlled local distribution 
of cocaine, human smuggling and possibly other underworld activities in their area of 
influence. 
The Cachiros steadily funneled their earnings into the licit economy and positioned 
themselves as important political and economic players on a national scale. In 
September 2013, when Honduran and US authorities began seizing the organization’s 
properties, US and Honduran officials estimated the group’s assets at $500 million and 
$800 million respectively.34 In an interview, a top official at the country’s asset seizure 
group, which goes by the acronym OABI, said the value of the assets was closer to $300 
million.35 
The businesses played an important role in the regional and possibly the national 
economy. The group’s cattle ranching business, Ganaderos Agricultores del Norte, was 
one of the largest purveyors of meat in the northeast, and, according to one buyer of this 
meat, the country.36 They had bought and developed at least two hotels and a zoo and 
eco-park called Joya Grande. They allegedly had a strong hand in the operations of the 
Tocoa soccer club, Real Sociedad, although those ties may have been severed after the 
high profile actions against the family by the US. More recently, they had branched into 
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mining. In all, Honduran authorities said they had seized 128 different Cachiros’ 
assets,37 including a transport company, a security company, various large plots of land, 
a clothing store, a gasoline station, and tens of millions in cash.38 
The Cachiros also had vast African palm plantations in the Bajo Aguan region near their 
de facto headquarters, Tocoa, as well as to the west in the state of Cortés. They owned 
one of the few African palm-processing plants in the country, which one US official said 
was not operational.39 The African palm industry is ripe for organized crime infiltration 
on many levels: it involves large extensions of land where it’s easy to establish 
clandestine airstrips and keep them hidden; regular transactions in cash; use of many 
vehicles, including trucks that help transport all types of goods; influx of chemicals and 
outflows of products, which facilitates the movement of illicit products and money 
laundering activities; and connections with other large, agro-industrial projects and the 
political power that comes with them. Traditional agri-business ventures such as cattle 
are mainstays for illicit interests for many of the same reasons.   
The Cachiros and Transnational Elites 
Figure 2: Rosenthal Organizational Chart 
 
Source: Taken from US Treasury 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Honduras Elites and Organized Crime        	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  
www.InSightCrime.org   70	  
The Cachiros used their licit businesses and their participation in the political process to 
place them in the closest proximity to the elites. This contact seems to have led to some 
business arrangements and possibly some campaign contributions, though, as noted at 
the outset, the evidence is scarce. The Cachiros, like most criminal enterprises, used 
proxies to front their businesses and appear to have given contributions in cash, 
although they may have videotaped some of their encounters.40 They also used 
intermediaries to deal with their partners. Because the group’s members often are not 
the listed principals of the companies, and because they do not directly handle the 
businesses or political relations, it is impossible to know whether their partners were 
aware that they were working with suspected criminals unless they have at some point 
been prosecuted. The evidence presented here is therefore largely circumstantial and is 
not to be considered a formal accusation of any wrongdoing. 
Arguably the most important business interaction between the Cachiros and the 
transnational elites was through the banking sector. The banking sector, as noted 
earlier, is one of Honduras’ most important and is largely controlled by the 
transnational elites. It has thrived in recent decades as Honduras has become integrated 
into the global economy, and remittances and investment in businesses such as fast food 
franchises have soared. The Cachiros were, in effect, some of the country’s largest 
providers of remittances and local investment in agro-industrial and tourism projects. 
The Cachiros banked at various places including one of the largest, family-owned 
operations in Honduras, Continental Bank. Of the 64 accounts, seized by the 
government, “the vast majority,” were with Continental, according to one government 
official who investigated the group.41 The Cachiros, the investigator said, “had all their 
lines of credit with the Continental Bank.” This included the cattle, African Palm, and 
the zoo, he said. The bank’s connections to the Cachiros did not go unnoticed by 
authorities. In 2014 the government’s Banking and Insurance Commission fined the 
bank some 12 million lempiras (just over $500,000) for failure to check the source of 
some of their clients' income, the government investigator said. 
There is nothing official to tie the Cachiros to the bank’s owners, the powerful Rosenthal 
clan, but the bank has come under some scrutiny from officials in other circumstances 
as well. In 2012, for example, the government sought to create a privately held escrow 
fund to manage collections and distribution from a special security tax. The fund 
manager would have to handle sensitive information, including how the resources 
would be spent on the security forces as well as other security-related equipment, 
infrastructure and projects. Continental offered the most attractive bid, according to two 
sources close to the process. However, members of the government’s Banking and 
Insurance Commission, as well as outside consultants, recommended the government 
steer clear of this bank because it had not followed proper protocol in vetting some of its 
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customers, among them the Rivera Maradiaga family.42 The government eventually 
decided to manage the funds itself through the Central Bank, offering a public excuse for 
its sudden change in direction.43 
The most damning accusation against the bank came from the United States Justice 
Department. In October 2015, the US arrested Yankel Rosenthal, the nephew of Jaime 
Rosenthal Oliva. The Rosenthal family owns Continental Bank, as well as numerous 
other companies. Following the arrest, the US unsealed an indictment against Yankel, 
Jaime, Jaime’s son, Yani, and a company lawyer named Andrés Acosta García for money 
laundering.44 On the same day, the US Treasury added the family to its “kingpin” 
list,45 prohibiting businesses from engaging with the Rosenthal family businesses and 
effectively destroying its powerful conglomerate, which had operated for nearly half a 
century.   
The Rosenthals are a Romanian-Jewish family that settled in Honduras in 1929.46 Its 
patriarch, Jaime Rosenthal Oliva, is a perennial political and economic juggernaut 
in Honduras. He ran for president in 1985, was Vice President in the late 1980s and 
remains a high-ranking official in the Liberal Party. His son, Yani Benjamin Rosenthal 
Hidalgo, is following in his father’s footsteps and ran for president in the last elections. 
Yani Rosenthal is still a member of Congress and an important party official. The rest of 
the Rosenthals are spread throughout the family businesses. 
The family’s holdings make them one of country’s top five conglomerates, according to 
various unofficial tabulations done by media, academics and economists in Honduras. 
In addition to the bank, the Continental Group, as the conglomerate is known, owns a 
percentage of another Honduran top tier bank, Banco de Occidente,47 a cement 
company, an insurance company, a coffee export business, a television station, a meat-
packing plant, a newspaper, and a leather goods operation, and many other businesses. 
Some of the group’s economic assets veer into non-traditional exports such as African 
palm oil and alligator farms. 
Notwithstanding the issue with the special security tax, Continental and the Rosenthals 
also do major business with the government, especially as it relates to public-private 
partnership initiatives.48 In 2013, for instance, the bank was selected to manage funds 
for a project that sought to recuperate “lost” energy costs.49 During the same year, the 
bank was selected to manage scholarships for the Education Ministry in five 
states.50 For its part, Banco de Occidente, also regularly receives government contracts, 
such as those relating to the purchase of medicines for the public health care system.51 
The Continental Group also did business with the Cachiros. Jamie Rosenthal and his 
daughter Patricia Rosenthal, in an interview with InSight Crime, say this relationship 
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began in the late 1970s or early 1980s, when Javier Rivera Maradiaga began bringing 
cattle from Colón to sell to the Rosenthal’s meat packing plant, Empacadora 
Continental, in San Pedro Sula. Javier, the Rosenthals said, was poor, selling about a 
dozen cattle a time, then sleeping in his car on the street before driving home the next 
day. Over time, his situation changed. 
“And he just got steadily bigger. You look and see a person who starts small and then 
afterwards gets a little truck, and then another and another,” he explained. “He was 
doing good business; he was growing.” 
The Rosenthals admit the Rivera Maradiaga clan eventually set up accounts in 
Continental Bank, but they say Cachiros were not managing exorbitant amounts of 
money in these accounts. “The accounts that they managed were in line with the 
businesses they had,” Patricia Rosenthal, who is listed as the Vice President of 
Continental Bank, said. 
As noted by the government prosecutor, the big business between the Continental 
Group and the Cachiros was in loans. The Rosenthals said they first loaned the Rivera 
Maradiaga family money for their cattle and milk production businesses in 2006. 
“That was when we started to have a relationship with them, of loans, and that was 
when the relations began with the bank,” Patricia Rosenthal explained. “The meat 
packing plant knew him. They brought more cattle and we said, ‘Look, this could be a 
good client,’ and we lent to them for the cattle and the dairy farm. The dairy products 
they sold in [La] Ceiba to a large cattle ranch and the cattle to us and other meat packing 
plants. For the bank, this was not a bad business, I mean they had good [cattle], they 
could pay us, the buyers, directly, all of whom were big.”  
The Rosenthals said that like any client, they ran the Rivera Maradiaga family through 
their due diligence process but got no red flags. They added that the Cachiros paid back 
their loans in checks and showed InSight Crime a copy of a signed check provided to the 
bank by Javier Rivera Maradiaga, which they said was a payment for a loan. (See 
photograph below) 
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Other loans came after the cattle and milk production business loans, including some 
for the Cachiros’ African palm plantations. The Rosenthals said it was a natural fit: the 
bank’s strong suit was lending to agriculture businesses, and the Rivera Maradiagas 
were good clients. 
“They were good clients for us,” Patricia Rosenthal said. “Another important thing is 
that the bank’s strength is in the north, which includes the northern coast, and we are 
the strongest bank in agriculture and housing. [This is] because the board of directors 
that presides over the bank has always believed that it is our duty to give back to these 
areas in Honduras.” 
Perhaps the most obvious connection between business group and theCachiros is that 
Continental Bank was a major investor in the Joya Grande Zoo and Eco-park, evidenced 
by the plaque commemorating this support at the zoo’s entrance and an outstanding 
loan the bank gave for the construction of the zoo.52 Government sources told InSight 
Crime they believe the bank had not reclaimed the remainder of the loan because of the 
questions it would face regarding its due diligence practices.53 
The Rosenthals said they had not reclaimed it because the loan was tied up in the legal 
process against the Cachiros. While it has been arguably the most embarrassing, public 
connection between Continental Group and the Rivera Maradiaga family, the 
Rosenthals insisted that it was a good business that did not involve drug money. “It’s not 
a project that they were going to pay with drugs, it was a project that paid itself,” 
Rosenthal said. 
To be sure, the park still gets rave reviews from tourists.54 And the Rosenthals say it was 
an investment decision that has benefitted Honduras. 
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“When we analyzed this loan, it was a very good loan, not just for us but for the country. 
The loan paid itself off and promoted tourism in an area of the country where people 
normally never went. They did a great job because they started to attract people from all 
of Central America,” Jaime Rosenthal said. 
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Continental Bank also supported the Tocoa soccer team, which the Rivera Maradiaga 
family allegedly supported financially. The logo of the bank appeared on Real Sociedad’s 
shirt, and as of 2012, the bank was listed on the team’s website as an official sponsor. 
But that type of support is not unusual, Jaime Rosenthal said. The bank sponsors other 
teams, such as the perennial powerhouse Marathón, which the Rosenthals own. Tocoa’s 
team is also sponsored by the likes of Coca-Cola. In a written response to an InSight 
Crime article that talked about the Tocoa team’s alleged connections to theCachiros, 
Jaime Rosenthal said advertising on soccer jerseys is just good business; he also 
defended the bank’s record of transparency.55 
“Certainly your article damages our image, and it is causing problems to us,” Rosenthal 
wrote to InSight Crime. “We have been in business in Hondurasfor more than 100 
years… We have audited statements for more than 35 years, and we can prove the origin 
of every penny we have.” 
The Cachiros, and Traditional and Bureaucratic Elites 
Throughout this period of incredible economic growth for the trafficking group, 
the Cachiros became more involved in politics, fostering candidates from various 
parties, supporting local festivals and social programs, and developing the type of 
business contacts that allowed them to work with the government and to influence its 
operations. These connections were facilitated by the financial contributions from the 
criminal organization to the politicians themselves and began a process whereby the 
criminal group could penetrate all portions of the state and society. 
The extent of the Cachiros’ campaign contributions is unknown, but numerous 
Honduran and international investigators, as well as local sources in Colón, told InSight 
Crime that they were significant and regular. The group also appears to have been an 
equal opportunity giver. The country’s two main parties, the National Party and Liberal 
Party, were both beneficiaries, Honduran and foreign authorities told InSight Crime. 
Other parties also benefitted from the Cachiros’ campaign investments, various sources 
said. 
The contributions shine a light on a fundamental weakness in the Honduraspolitical 
system: Honduras and other developing nations’ political parties depend heavily on 
wealthy donors. What’s more, there is little, if any regulation of these campaign 
contributions. Honduran law does not put limits on the amount individuals can donate, 
nor does it require publication of the names of donors. It is also unclear which, if any, 
government institution is directly responsible for supervising campaign finance 
issues.56 There is no rigorous oversight committee investigating campaign contributions 
inHonduras, and evidence of illicit contributions is anecdotal and often circumstantial. 
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InSight Crime investigators, for example, heard stories about a politician’s campaign at 
a “narco-owned” hotel and the exchange of “suitcases full of cash.” But there are no 
judicial cases on the record on which to base these assertions. 
Nevertheless, numerous sources told InSight Crime that these political contributions are 
helping to rebuild the traditional elites’ power, which is centered on controlling the 
political process as much as it is the accumulation of new sources of capital. In this 
regard, Honduran government sources told InSight Crime that the Cachiros’ political 
connections were centered on various current and former congressmen, and a former 
governor of the state. 
Among these, former governor of Colón Juan Gómez Melendez was the most important 
political operative the Cachiros had, intelligence sources told InSight Crime. Before his 
murder in January 2015, he was the Cachiros’ proxy of choice and their most active 
intermediary with other business and political allies, according to government 
intelligence officials and documents obtained by InSight Crime. He operated at least 
part of their cattle and palm oil operations, intelligence officials said. One company he 
ran secured public works contracts and maintained relations with other important 
figures that operate in this opaque narco-political world. 
This mix of illicit capital, corruption and narco-influence creates a lucrative merry-go-
round that is most clearly illustrated by the various companies that obtain public works 
projects and licenses to develop, for example, mineral extraction or tourism projects. 
Both the illicit actors and the politicians benefit from these contracts. The politicians 
receive kickbacks or an economic share in the projects. And the illicit actors are able to 
strengthen their legitimate business interests, extend their social capital and hide their 
illicit proceeds. 
In the case of the Cachiros, InSight Crime investigators found numerous contracts 
between Rivera Maradiaga-controlled companies and the Fondo Vial, or Highway Fund, 
the government agency responsible for administrating the building and maintenance of 
the country’s national roadways, bridges, and tunnels. The contracts between the 
Cachiros’ companies and the Fondo Vial, which occurred between 2010 and 2013, 
totaled a little over $4 million (84,751,000 Lempiras). They included stretches of roads 
between three departments: Colón, Olancho and Yoro. The contracts covered 
“emergency” fixes, building roads and constructing one bridge.  
The man executing these contracts was Hugo Ardón, the head of the Fondo Vial up until 
June 2015. Ardón is the brother of the infamous former mayor of El Paraíso, Copán, 
Alexander Ardón. Alexander Ardón made himself famous for refurbishing the mayor’s 
office to make it look like the White House, which included adding a heliport on the city 
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hall roof, and has long faced down accusations of drug trafficking. Not surprisingly, the 
brothers also executed public works contracts.57 
In 2014, the Honduras Security minister told InSight Crime that Alexander Ardón was 
under investigation for drug trafficking, but no charges have been filed and Alexander 
Ardón has denied any connections to illicit activities in the past.58 Sources suggested to 
InSight Crime that this lack of action against Alexander Ardón was related to Hugo 
Ardón’s connections to the presidency. In addition to running the Fondo Vial, Hugo 
Ardón ran Juan Orlando Hernández’s presidential campaign in the western part of the 
country.59 
These alliances have developed, in part, because internal and external economic factors 
have changed the composition of Honduran society and power dynamics amongst the 
elites. The country’s economy remains dependent on money from foreign sources. But it 
has expanded the channels through which this money passes and the number of 
beneficiaries it has. What this means in practice is that control over the government 
posts that are the filter for this capital is more important than ever. And it is in these 
spaces where a new brand of what we are calling bureaucratic elites60 are merging with 
traditional elites and challenging the transnational elites who have runHonduras for 
decades. 
As outlined in our first case study, on Juan Ramón Matta Ballesteros, these bureaucratic 
elites are often a hybrid between those who depend on government posts for their power 
and those who come from traditional, landed backgrounds and have since secured 
political power. President Juan Orlando Hernández is a good example of this new, 
hybrid elite. As the first case study shows, the president has used both his personal 
wealth and his government posts to become the preeminent power in the country. 
Understanding that the base of his power is reliant on bureaucratic posts, he has also 
placed his allies in important positions throughout the government. 
Among these allies is retired General Julián Pacheco, who represents an example of how 
these bureaucratic elites have intersected with the Cachiros. Pacheco was the head of the 
military’s battalion in Colón in the early 2000s, while the Cachiros were gaining 
prominence. The governor at the time was the aforementioned Juan Gómez Meléndez. 
Pacheco had a close relationship with Gómez, who was the government’s interlocutor in 
the region on security matters. The two met on an almost weekly basis, Pacheco said in 
an interview.61 They remained in touch after Pacheco moved to another post, although 
Pacheco said he distanced himself from the politician before his murder in January 
2015. 
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Bureaucratic elites are in a unique position. As noted in the first case study, they are 
both the direct beneficiaries of their connections to illicit actors, and, ironically, 
beneficiaries of the resources to fight it. Both of these relationships to organized crime 
come from their control of these government posts. Their understanding and ability to 
control these filters is what has helped catapult them into the positions they currently 
hold, and they will do most anything to keep these positions. In other words, they need 
political power and the resources that come with it. To get there, they rely on illicit 
campaign contributions as much as any other elite. 
Bureaucratic elites also have a vested interest in maintaining this system where the 
government is the all-important gatekeeper to these and other public resources, and the 
guardian of law and order. The system works for them in numerous ways, including 
giving them the pretext to strengthen the security forces, broaden its powers of 
vigilance, guard its finances under a veil of secrecy and “national security,” and 
undermine the balance of powers. All of these actions help them keep the status quo, 
win more allies and weaken rivals.  
The Cachiros and Social Elites 
In addition to their connections with the transnational, traditional and bureaucratic 
elites, the Cachiros depend on an elaborate arrangement of other actors to do their illicit 
and licit businesses. To begin with, they have thousands of employees, among them 
lawyers, engineers, as well as construction, agricultural and transport workers. They 
reportedly pay a large number of taxi drivers, indigents and persons with disabilities 
who spend large amounts of time in public places to work as informants. Sources in 
Tocoa say the Cachiros regularly interact with religious authorities as well as community 
leaders, and help pay for local festivals. Their social standing has reportedly risen with 
their management of the soccer team, which competed for the championship of the 
Honduran soccer league several years in a row when the Rivera Maradiaga family took 
an interest.  
At least part of the Cachiros’ social cache comes from the fact that at some point they 
kept gang violence and extortion in check, local authorities and other sources told 
InSight Crime. The group’s strongest gang connection is with the feared 18th Street gang, 
or Barrio 18. The Dieciocho, as it is most commonly known, is one of the two most 
prominent street gangs in the western hemisphere. The Cachiros used the gang’s 
branches to receive, store and move drugs in small quantities, local and foreign 
investigators say. These groups moved the drugs using motorcycles and cars that 
intermittently go off road to avoid police and military checkpoints. The Cachiros exerted 
some control over the groups’ activities, which include the local sale of drugs that 
the Cachiros themselves provide, often as an in-kind payment for the gang's services.  
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The irony is that the arrival of larger quantities of illicit drugs is in and of itself one 
cause of increased violence in Honduras in recent years. The Violence Observatory 
reported that Colón had 277 homicides in 2014, giving it a murder rate of more than 88 
per 100,000 inhabitants.62 The violence is, according to a local prosecutor, in part due 
to competition for what they call “lines” (lineas) of territory, where gangs can sell their 
product. Local sources reported that the Cachiros had said they would push to lower the 
violence, but the high number of homicides indicates that it may have been out of their 
control. 
Some local sources reported that the Cachiros may have extended their network to 
include farmers’ cooperatives. There are at least seven peasant farmer cooperatives in 
the region, many of which have thousands of members and control large tracts of land. 
These groups campaign and carry out land invasions in an attempt to recover land that 
they claim was transferred into private hands in the 1990s through fraud or by force. 
The leaders of these groups can in some senses be considered as a form of social elite in 
the region, given their power to influence their large membership, and their 
international links to non-governmental organizations in Europe and the United States. 
The United Peasant Farmer Movement of the Aguan (Movimiento Unificado Campesino 
del Aguan - MUCA), for example, has been present in the region since its formation in 
2001, and now reportedly controls some 4,000 hectares of land, more than any 
cooperative in the area. 
As documented above, there is evidence that other actors in the land conflict, including 
local military units and large landowners, have been compromised by criminal groups. 
Some farmers’ cooperatives may have been as well. The stakes are high -- the conflict 
has cost more than 100 lives since 2010, including peasant farmers, members of the 
security forces, and agribusiness employees. Peasant farmers are particularly vulnerable 
to this violence, and activists reported that at least 88 farmers or their supporters were 
killed between 2010 and 2013, many in targeted attacks.63 
One cooperative member told InSight Crime researchers that elements within the local 
cooperatives had formed links with drug traffickers in the region. The cooperative 
member said that elements within the cooperatives benefitted from these dealings. In 
exchange for weapons to fight the land conflict, members of the peasant farmer group 
offer drug storage facilities and allow drug shipments to move through their territory, 
and may even carry out contract killings for the traffickers. 
There are numerous armed groups in the area, some of whom have been linked to the 
large farming interests, others to the cooperatives and still others to the drug trafficking 
groups. As noted above, some of them can camouflage their activities behind the 
pretense that they are private security. Land conflicts often involve conflict and 
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separating one armed group from another, as well as discerning alliances, is a near 
impossible task. 
InSight Crime researchers were present during one such takeover during a field trip to 
the area in August 2013. The cooperative, an offshoot of MUCA that called itself MOCRA 
(Movimiento Campesino Recuperacion del Aguan), included about 200 peasant 
farmers. Private security on the land -- which news sources said belonged to Miguel 
Facussé64-- fired at the cooperative members, who were also armed. Three squatters 
were injured.65 Reinforcements for MOCRA arrived in high-end 4 x 4 pickups and well 
armed, but by then the police and the army had arrived and kept the farmers from 
proceeding with their plan to continue the incursion. 
The upshot of these connections to the social elites is that they are hard to separate from 
the Cachiros’ general political and economic presence in the zone. The potential links to 
influential cooperatives, religious authorities and other important members of society 
come with actually being a family that has thousands of employees, numerous 
businesses and extensive stretches of land. 
What is clear is that the Cachiros understood the importance of the social elite, and they 
appeared to be using these connections to their advantage. This was manifest after the 
government seized some of its properties and businesses. Hundreds of employees and 
their family members took to the streets and marched with placards in support of the 
criminal organization. They also issued direct warnings to then candidate Juan Orlando 
Hernández about the potential political repercussions should he attempt to extradite 
Rivera Maradiaga family members to the United States to face charges. (See video 
below) 
We do not know if these manifestations had a direct impact on government policy. 
However, the government has made an effort to keep at least part of the Cachiros’ 
businesses running. 
Conclusions -­ A Dangerous Game 
The connections between Honduran elites and major criminal groups fit, in many ways, 
within the larger scheme of Honduran economic and political development. Honduras’ 
economy has long depended on foreign capital to spur growth. First mining and then 
bananas became the heart of an economy that was mostly foreign owned. Later 
economic diversification, spurred by foreign assistance and remittances, became the 
center of a sputtering system that is more about facilitating the movement of foreign 
capital than improving the ability to generate capital locally. 
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Large scale drug trafficking fits into this economic system. It is part of the service 
economy. The biggest groups are essentially facilitators, moving illegal cocaine from one 
end of the country to the other. Its returns are giant remittances that are plowed back 
into various parts of the economy and political system. The size of the drug business 
makes it a formidable participant in Honduran society, so much so that it is playing a 
role in the development of the economy and in party politics.   
This is evident in the case of the Cachiros, who have established strong ties to the three 
main categories of elites in this country: the transnational, the traditional and the 
bureaucratic. These intersections are common throughout the country. The traditional 
elites, whose wealth is concentrated in land-based projects such as coffee and cattle, 
mostly intersect with criminal groups in the political realm, where these elites have 
surged in recent years to challenge Honduras’ long-time powerbrokers, the 
transnational elites. These transnational elites are more diversified and their needs are 
different, but some of them intersect and possibly interact with the criminal groups in 
the economic realm, most notably in the financial sector. The bureaucratic elites cross 
over with the Cachiros in state business and security matters. 
This relationship between the Cachiros and the transnational elites is most clearly 
illustrated by the business dealings between the Cachiros and the Continental Group, 
the powerful conglomerate owned and run by the Rosenthal family. It is difficult to 
know what motivated the relationship between the Continental Group and the Cachiros, 
aside from business. On the surface, this may appear self-evident. The banking industry, 
for example, seeks capital; the criminal interests have vast amounts of capital. This 
capital, and the transactions it implies, gives banks a powerful incentive to shirk the due 
diligence and “know your customer” practices encouraged by international regulators.66 
For their part, the Rosenthals denied they shirked any of their responsibilities. They said 
the bank’s due diligence turned up nothing that would impede the bank from doing 
business with the Rivera Maradiaga family. What’s more, they claimed they broke all 
relations with the group when the United States Treasury declared the Cachiros targets 
in 2013. “We had no reason to believe that they were as devious as they turned out to 
be,” Jaime Rosenthal told InSight Crime. 
“Because there was no document or anything that said they were involved in drug 
trafficking,” Patricia Rosenthal added. 
The same is true with the relationship between the Continental Group and 
theCachiros outside of banking. InSight Crime has no evidence, for example, to suggest 
that the relations between the Cachiros’ cattle ranching operations and any meat 
packing plant was nefarious in nature or went beyond the simple reason that one had a 
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product to sell and the other had a product they wanted to process. In fact, the overlap 
between the Cachiros and the Continental Group could be passed off as circumstantial: 
the two families could run in the same circles and simply have mutual business 
interests.   
At the same time, though, it is clear the Cachiros and the Rosenthals are not from the 
same circles -- not even close. The two families do not come from the same region or 
from the same economic strata. The Cachiros’ background of cattle rustlers and drug 
traffickers puts them in a completely different social class as the owners of one of the 
largest conglomerates in Honduras. What’s more, there is nothing to suggest that 
the Cachiros were major political and business players prior to their surge in earnings 
from trafficking cocaine across Honduras in large quantities. 
The incentives that bring the Cachiros in proximity with the Rosenthal family need not 
be obvious to be attractive. Criminal-owned businesses often have multiple purposes. In 
order to conceal illicit proceeds, for example, organized crime can offer significant 
financial incentives to legitimate businesses and clients. In the case of the financial 
industry, the trade-off could be in the large amount of money they put into their 
accounts or the amount they pay to move the money through those accounts. 
Organized crime groups may also offer their clients or partners steep discounts on their 
products. Although the Rosenthals said they did not receive any discounts for buying 
cattle from the Rivera Maradiaga family, theCachiros reportedly employed this practice 
in their hardware stores in Tocoa, which were known in the area for selling cheap but 
high-quality products. In these cases, both the criminals and their clients see the 
transaction as a win: the clients get cheap products or large amounts of capital, and the 
criminals launder their proceeds and achieve a competitive advantage in the market. 
This competitive advantage extends to all their businesses. 
The Rivera Maradiaga family was also an important economic player. In essence, by 
dealing with the Rivera Maradiaga family, the Continental Group was allied with a 
significant economic conglomerate that provided it with capital and new business 
opportunities, as well as economic and political connections. The Rosenthals, for 
instance, said the Rivera Maradiaga family was the most important distributor of milk 
in Honduras and one of the most important purveyors of cattle. All of these factors make 
the Continental Group more competitive, allowing it to expand its hold on some of the 
most important industries in the country. The relationship with Continental Group, in 
turn, offered the Cachiros a means by which it could launder its proceeds via numerous, 
cash-heavy businesses. In all of this, the bank is the key. If the bank does not do its due 
diligence, then all the other activities can move as much of the illicit proceeds as 
necessary through its doors. 
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The connections also gave the Cachiros a higher social standing. This bid for legitimacy 
worked. The Cachiros, as the chief of the police in Tocoa told InSight Crime, were seen 
as “señores del pueblo,” i.e., legitimate businessmen and unofficial brokers of the public 
interest. When the Rivera Maradiaga family launched one of its latest ventures, a 
gasoline station and mall, the area’s elites were in attendance, including Ramón Lobo, 
the former congressman and brother to ex President Porfirio Lobo.67 When their 
businesses were targeted for seizure by the government, there were large protests in 
Tocoa. 
“If there was something the Rivera Maradiaga brothers had it was loyalty from the 
people. They always treated their workers well, and they didn’t try to scare everyone. 
They were cold-blooded killers with their enemies, but with the locals they were always 
acting in solidarity and were very generous,” one intelligence official told La Prensa.68  
The number and range of shared business interests certainly raises questions about 
whether the Rosenthals were aware of the Cachiros’ illicit activities. 
However, Honduras offers little disincentive for developing these ties. Whispers about 
the Cachiros’ licit and illicit proceeds stretch back years, but neither the press nor the 
government spoke publicly against them. Even after the US Treasury put 
the Cachiros on its “kingpin” list, then-President Porfirio Lobo made only one limited, 
indirect public reference to the group. 
“There are a lot of units that are investigating all these [criminal] groups, incuding this 
group. These should be the units that know about these different [criminal] groups,” the 
president said.69  
When InSight Crime met with them, the Rosenthals also portrayed themselves as 
victims. They claimed they did not have the resources or the wherewithal to check all of 
their clients’ background and said that should be the government’s job. 
“Our obligation should be, if there was a person who was responsible, that if we got 
information, we could give it to that person, and they could review it. They had the 
capacity to review it and say, ‘It’s not true. It’s an urban myth,’ or, ‘It’s true. Don’t do 
business with them,’” Jaime Rosenthal responded. “But what we have now is that they 
are waiting for us to determine who is a criminal and who is not a criminal. That is what 
the state is for, what the government is for. That is not the bank’s role, not the individual 
[citizen’s] role. That is why the state was created.” 
At one point, the Rosenthals actually asked for assistance from the United States 
government to help it do due diligence. “In Banco Continental, S.A. we are and want to 
be very careful about our business and our customers, and since Grupo Continental is 
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involved in many businesses including agro-business, we have to be especially careful 
about the people with whom we do business,” a March 2012 letter written by Jaime 
Rosenthal to the US Embassy read. “To us a clean name is very important and since the 
DEA and the US Embassy are the best informed people in Honduras, we will very much 
appreciate it that we can confirm with DEA some of the names of our customers to make 
sure that we will not get involved in any business that can damage the name of our 
family."70 
Regardless of how much the Rosenthals knew about their partners’ illicit activities, they 
also had a legitimate and valid excuse for not withdrawing from these relationships: 
there are no criminal charges against any member of the Rivera Maradiaga family 
in Honduras that would directly prohibit the Continental Group from doing business 
with the Cachiros. 
That grey area -- where the legality is in question but nothing is proven -- is large 
in Honduras and allows elite actors to continue to work with suspected illicit interests. 
Indeed, the judicial institutions, oversight committees and regulatory agencies are 
notoriously lax, incompetent and corruptible inHonduras. In most instances, this 
permits elites to shape and bend the rules so they can maintain the status quo. In this 
instance, it gives the transnational elites plausible deniability and the ability to adjust to 
a new economic and political reality -- the growing power of organized crime and rival 
elites -- that might otherwise put their interests at risk. As Jaime Rosenthal told InSight 
Crime, “We have not done anything illegal.” 
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What motivated the relationship between the Cachiros and the traditional and 
bureaucratic elites is more difficult to establish empirically. Current and former 
politicians appeared to act as emissaries for the group: helping them legalize and 
legitimize their economic holdings; ensuring favorable legislation for their business 
interests; and protecting them, their families and their close allies from prosecution. 
Perhaps the clearest advantage for the criminal organization was its ability to affect how 
public funds were allocated in their area of influence. The prospect of building roads, for 
example, was very attractive for the Cachiros on many levels. With public works 
projects, they could obtain a lucrative contract, which also allowed them to provide local 
employment and build up their social capital. It was also a means by which they could 
launder illicit proceeds, provide kickbacks to political operatives and help with 
campaign contributions. 
However, the relationship between the Cachiros and these elites was much more 
profound than simply trading favors. While there were the expected elements of political 
payoffs, the alliance between large organized crime groups and traditional and 
bureaucratic elites has had an impact that lasts much longer than the government 
contracts they can secure. These illicit actors are shaping a state in which the principal 
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source of capital accumulation is dependent on this mixture of illicit and government 
capital, and the political power financed by it. This is especially acute in countries 
like Honduras because, as noted, the earnings of these criminal organizations can be 
significant, and because their investments and spending in the local economy can rival 
local and national government expenditures. 
The result is to contort the economic-political calculus and catapult a hybrid elite built 
around these licit and illicit operations. The basis of this nefarious alliance is not new. 
The political system in Honduras has always been financed by the wealthy. The political 
parties have long been beholden to these campaign financiers, doing their bidding by 
giving tax exonerations, granting no bid contracts, limiting regulation and undermining 
the justice system. The new system’s beneficiaries and financiers, however, expect these 
and other favors, including the promise to limit criminal investigations pertaining 
to money laundering, drug trafficking and homicides, among others, and the ability to 
partake in the corruption and nepotism so prominent in government business dealings. 
The new model reinforces itself in various ways. Criminal groups operate with impunity 
and assistance of local politicians. The groups use this economic might to exert influence 
on the political process by supporting these same politicians or by propping up political 
parties. The candidates and parties are beholden to these criminal groups, and support 
favorable legislation that opens business opportunities for the alliance, and lobby for 
measures that limit security force operations. The politicians -- and their bureaucratic 
allies -- also take advantage of these relationships to strengthen their own hand, 
extracting resources from government coffers or using their influence to further their 
own economic and political interests. 
The implications of these alliances are broad. Various economic and political 
movements seem to be developing around the influx and movement of illicit capital. 
And while on one level this capital fits within the larger historical scheme of Honduran 
economic and political development, there are some important differences from what 
has gone before. What separates this period from others is the illicit nature of this 
capital and the dangers it poses to democratic governance. Illicit capital skews the 
economic and political playing field, and undermines the democratic process through 
the corrupting influence of money, and the threat of the use of force.  
The situation has led to considerable tension. As noted above, some elite groups have 
chosen to align themselves with the generators of this illicit capital. There appear to be 
clear benefits to these connections and very few disincentives. The clearest incentive is 
the access to this huge influx of foreign capital. Since there is little risk of prosecution, 
there appear to be few downsides for the elites. As long as there are no formal charges 
against these illicit actors, the elites in question have plausible deniability. 
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But what about those who resist? Crossing the criminal actors carries with it multiple 
risks that go beyond the loss of financial backing. The Cachiros, for example, expect a lot 
from their political allies, and relations with congressional representatives have been 
contentious at times. As noted earlier, their support for one representative was 
contingent on many things, including his ability to install an ally in the Security 
Ministry. The congressman’s subsequent assassination illustrates just how high the 
stakes are. As noted in the case of the assassination of Juan Gómez Meléndez, the stakes 
appear to be equally high for the criminal groups. By fleeing to the United States, 
the Cachiros may have escaped the wrath of the elites.  
The process is playing out in real time, so it is difficult -- and might be premature -- to 
gauge the reach and power of these converging interests, the exact substance of their 
alliances or relations with criminal organizations, and the way in which these two 
interact on the various social, political and economic planes. What we can say, however, 
is that the calculation of whether or not to align one’s interests with criminal groups has 
shifted. From the elites’ perspective, saying no to these alliances may have worse 
implications than saying yes. This is, in part, due to the perception that inHonduras, 
politics is a zero-sum game. As evident from the rising debt, the amount of public 
resources and foreign capital coming into the country cannot feed the appetite of these 
elites. 
Thus, the discussion is not about right or wrong in Honduras but survival. The situation 
appears to be reaching the point where all the elites are facing the same dilemma: align 
their interests with the narco-powers surging in the country, or stand by as these powers 
assume control of the country’s most important economic and political levers. In the 
end, dirty money provided by illicit criminal groups and businesses may mean the 
difference between winning and losing a political campaign, securing or not securing an 
important contract or business venture, and maintaining or losing a privileged position 
in Honduran society. 
*This report was written by Steven Dudley. Dudley, Javier Meléndez -- who acted as 
coordinator for research for this project -- along with researchers from the Centro de 
Investigación y Promoción de los Derechos Humanos (CIPRODEH) and the Asociación 
para una Sociedad más Justa (ASJ), assisted in the investigation and production of 
this report. Jorge Mejía Galindo developed the maps. Andrew J Higgens did all the 
graphics. 
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Project Description 
Elites and organized crime is a multiyear project financed by the International 
Development Research Centre that investigates the dynamics between organized crime 
and elites in four countries: Honduras, Guatemala, Nicaragua and Colombia.  
For more of this series, go to: www.insightcrime.org 
Disclaimer 
The research presented in this report is not necessarily a reflection of the positions of 
the IDRC. The ideas, thoughts and opinions contained in this document are those of the 
author or authors. 
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The InSight Crime Foundation 
InSight Crime is a foundation dedicated to the study of the principal threat to national 
and citizen security in Latin America and the Caribbean: organized crime. 
We seek to deepen and inform the debate about organized crime in the Americas by 
providing the general public with regular reporting, analysis and investigation on the 
subject and on state efforts to combat it. 
We fulfill this mission by: 
•   providing high quality and timely analysis of news events linked to organized 
crime in the region; 
•   investigating and writing reports on organized crime and its multiple 
manifestations, including its impact on human rights, governance, drug policy 
and other social, economic and political issues; 
•   giving workshops to journalists, academics and non-governmental organizations 
on how to cover this important issue and keep themselves, their sources and their 
material safe; 
•   supporting local investigators through these workshops and by publishing, 
translating and promoting their work to reach the widest possible audience; 
•   developing a region-wide network of investigators looking at organized crime; 
•   presenting in public and closed-door sessions to governments, non-governmental 
organizations, academics and stakeholders on best practices, strategies and 
pitfalls in implementing citizen security policy on the ground. 
For more information, visit: www.insightcrime.org 
Or contact: info@insightcrime.org	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